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KIGYO NO SH4KAI-TEKI SEKININ: CHALLENGES FOR
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY INJAPAN
JANIS SARRA t & MASAFUMI NAKAHIGASHIt
I. INTRODUCTION
Globally, there is increasing discussion about corporate social responsibility
(CSR). Many large multinational enterprises, particularly in mining and
other resource sectors, have voluntarily adopted CSR programs, having
concluded that social, economic, and environmental sustainability measures
are good both for the "bottom line" and for the communities in which they
operate. Companies in Japan have yet to move in that direction, although
there are a few notable exceptions. In part, this lack of adaptation to the
growing interest in CSR internationally is due to cultural and social norms in
Japan that suggest that many aspects of CSR properly belong to the domain
of remedial legislation, such as environmental protection legislation, human
rights law, and social safety nets.
There are different normative conceptions of CSR. One, based on a
shareholder-primacy model, is that the goal of corporate activity is to
maximize profits for shareholders, but that wealth maximization is best
accomplished by creating long-term sustainable companies that are socially
responsible. l For example, Berle argued that all powers granted to corporate
t Professor, and Director of the Peter Wall Institute for Advanced Studies, University of
British Columbia Faculty of Law, Canada.
Professor, Nagoya University School of Law, Japan.
See generallyAA Berle Jr, "For Whom Corporate Managers AreTrustees: A Note" (1931)
45:8 Harvard L Rev 1365 at 1365, 1372 (for a discussion of the dangers to corporations
that ignore social responsibilities). See also Janis Sarra, "Equity Derivatives and the
Challenge for Berle's Conception of Corporate Accountability" Seattle U L Rev
[forthcoming in 2012].
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managers were necessarily at all times to be exercised in the best interests of
shareholders. 2 While he acknowledged the powerful impact ofcorporations
on the lives of multiple stakeholders, he was concerned that, absent
shareholder primacy, directors and officers would engage in self-interested
conduct, rather than act in the best interests of the corporation, and,
hence, shareholders were best situated to hold officers accountable for
their decisions.3
Another conception of CSR is what Carroll has referred to as the
pyramid of CSR, taking into account four kinds of social responsibilities:
"economic, legal, ethical, and philanthropic."4 This framework suggests that
corporations should be operated to ensure economic sustainability and
profits; comply with statutes and other regulations that direct their activities;
operate within accepted societal norms, with good corporate citizenship,
defined as what is expected morally or ethically; and be philanthropic in
their involvement in the community and broader society.5 This conception
of corporate citizenship recognizes profit objectives but creates a much
broader conceptualization of the role of the corporation within society.
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's
GuidelinesforMultinationalEnterprises also offer some definitional guidance
on CSR.6 The OECD Guidelines contain CSR recommendations addressed
by 43 governments to their multinational enterprises and cover a broad range
of issues, including contributing to economic sustainability, recognizing and
respecting human rights, conducting due diligence in the supply chain,
producing fulsome disclosure, assisting in local capacity building, respecting
employment and industrial-relations laws and norms, protecting the
environment, combatting bribery, respecting consumer interests, advancing
2 Berle, supra note 1 at 1367.
3 Sarra, supra note I at 3.
4 Archie B Carroll, "The Pyramid of Corporate Social Responsibility: Toward the Moral
Management of Organizational Stakeholders" (1991) 34:4 Business Horizons 39 at 40.
5 Ibid at 40-43.
g Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD Guidelines for
MultinationalEnterprises (Paris: OECD 2011) [OECD Guidelines].
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science and technology, advancing competition, and complying with
taxation requirements.
7
These differing approaches to C SR respect the fundamental structure of
corporations but argue for different emphases on issues beyond profit
maximization. 8 As the discussion that follows indicates, there are two types
ofsustainability: the sustainability of the corporation and the sustainability
of society, in which the corporation has a role.
Normative differences in approaches to CSR are also complicated by
distinctions between common-law and civil-law jurisdictions and the role
that codified laws can play in corporate behaviour. Under common law,
corporations' CSR activities often lead statutory law. By setting norms of
conduct, corporations and their advocate organizations are able to shape
principles and best practices in CSR without the need for legislative
intervention, or their practices are used as baseline norms and activities that
shape new law. In contrast, in a number of civil-law systems, corporations act
with a careful eye to codified law. If that law requires companies to operate in
shareholders' best interests, it is harder to make a case for CSR absent
legislative change. If challenged, conduct is measured by the courts in terms
of compliance with the law, not overall business judgment, although business
judgment is respected in some jurisdictions.
The above situation can be seen in Japan within its framework as a civil-
law jurisdiction, specifically in the current discussion at Japan's Corporate
Law Committee Legislative Council (Corporate Law Committee), which
started examining corporate-law reform in April 2010.9 The Committee was
established to respond to Consultation No. 91, issued by the Minister of
7 See ibid.
8 There are also scholars and community advocates who argue for a more fundamental
restructuring of corporations and profits as another form of CSR, which essentially shifts
corporations from private actors into the public domain. While offering a very different
perspective that is important to consider, such an approach is beyond the scope of
discussion in this paper, which is aimed at a deeper understanding of the dynamics and
debate in Japan.




Justice.' ° In the consultation paper, the Minister suggested an approach that
would "ensure high credibility to corporations from a wide-range [of]
stakeholders, considering corporations' critical role in social and economic
fields"' One reason the Minister emphasized the protection of a wide range
of stakeholders is that the governing party was the Democratic Party, whose
main supporters have been labour unions. Notwithstanding that
background, to date the Committee has rejected all proposals favouring
employees or labour unions. Instead, the Committee is basing current plans
for reform on the shareholder-primacy model.'2
Considering the discussions to date at the Corporate Law Committee,
corporate directors and officers in Japan are predisposed to viewing their role
as one that must maximize benefits to their corporation, likely feeling some
concern that promoting CSR activities would place them at greater risk of
being accused by shareholders of breaching their duty to maximize profit.
Even if directors, as corporate citizens, undertake activities that are good for
stakeholders and/or society, they face a risk of liability for damages unless
they can be confident that they would be able to prove that expenses for CSR
activities would bring profit to the corporation. Directors in Japanese
corporations are willing to follow the duties expressed in written laws and
established judicial interpretations, especially decisions of the Supreme
Court of Japan. Although directors could launch CSR initiatives based on
what they believe is expected by cultural and social norms, they would take
the risk that their activities would be considered a waste of corporate
resources and a breach of their duties to maximize profit.
As a result of existing liability chill and the lack of a positive obligation to
implement CSR, where Japanese companies can externalize the costs of
doing business, such as environmental remediation or the social costs created
when a corporation exits a particular region, theywill. Such costs are viewed
as negative externalities, and if not required to account for the costs in their
productive activities, corporations are unlikely to do so. In part, the lack of
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which Japanese corporations operate. Unlike in common-law jurisdictions,
the civil law sets out legal obligations; and absent express language requiring
CSR, it is difficult for corporate officers to justify the expenditure.
Corporations are unlikely to shift from their current purely profit-
maximizing goals without express direction by the government through
legislative change. The absence of a strong movement towards CSR is also
likely due, in part, to long-standing normative beliefs by corporate directors
and officers that corporations should not have redistribution of wealth
as a goal, but rather, should be operating to maximize returns to their
equity investors.
In considering why CSR is a challenge in Japan, it is useful to make first-
hand observations about the taxi-cab industry. Japan is one of the easiest
places in the world to catch a taxi, even on the street. One does not have to
go to cab stands or hotels, as taxis are constantly circulating in traffic,
without passengers. In fact, the taxi corporations request that their drivers
drive around constantly seeking passengers, which, in turn, increases
environmentally harmful emissions. This example illustrates the
disconnection between Japanese business practices and environmental
protection. Responding to the Kyoto Protocol, adopted by the 3rd Session of
the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change in 1997,13 the Japan Federation of Hire-Taxi
Associations settled on an action plan for global-warming prevention in
1998.14 However, the proposal focuses mainly on technical efforts, including
facilitation of Global Positioning System automatic vehicle monitoring and
the development of hybrid vehicles for commercial usage, not on reduction
of emissions from vehicles runningwithout passengers. The proposal appears
to be aimed at activities that directly increase profit; for example, through
reputational benefits and the attraction of more customers who are willing to
13 United Nations, Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (1998), online: <http://unfccc.int>.
14 Japan Federation of Hire-Taxi Associations, ''-4 ' 3 
-
M {10MU) 7- L 1-6 H 1W ifl 1+fi! (Action Plan for the Prevention of Global




pay the additional cost of hybrid vehicles in order to save on energy costs.
The government strictly regulates the price of electric power, in contrast with
gas prices, which are not under the control of the government; although
Japan imposes a very high tax on gasoline to partially offset the externalities
involved. The stable price of electric power, at least prior to the unfortunate
events surrounding the March 2011 earthquakes, has meant that the move to
hybrid vehicles is appealing to the taxi industry. However, gas emissions will
continue to dominate the industry for the foreseeable future, and absent
prohibitively high fuel prices or government initiative, there is little incentive
to consider emissions reduction.
Another example of the narrow focus on profit making is illustrated
by some of the scholarly reaction 5 to Toyota Motor Corporation's
Sustainability Report 2009. The Report reads in part:
Since its founding, Toyota has advocated and strived to realize the
philosophy of contributing to society through monozukuri (manufacturing)
and automobile manufacturing.
At the basis of this philosophy is a way of thinking that emphasizes the
principles of Customer First and Genchi Genbutsu (on-site, hands on). While
the 70-year history of Toyota has been filled with challenges, our suppliers,
dealers and employees have worked together to overcome each crisis. There
is now felt to be a need to return again to Toyota's origins ....
The thinking behind the Customer First attitude has been nurtured in
Toyota since its founding days.... [The former president Shotaro Kamiya]
said: 'Users come first, then the dealers and, lastly, the maker: This refers to
the order of priority in receiving benefits from automobile sales. 6
Criticizing the Report, Hiroshi Okumura, former professor at Chuo
University, has argued that "the profit of the Toyota Motor Corporation
comes first, then the dealers and, lastly users",17 suggesting that this approach
must be the common understanding of corporate activities so that Toyota
15 See e.g. Hiroshi Okumura, M l~lE h 3 - (A Thorough Examination: Toyota),
(Tokyo: Nanatsumori Shokan, 2011) at 154-55.
16 Toyota Motor Corporation, Sustainability Report 2009 (Toyota City: Toyota, 2009)
at 4-5.
17 Okumura, supra note 15 at 154 [translated by author].
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can maximize its profits. Thus, even when global companies have sought to
shift their focus, in some instances they have come under attack by scholars
and other business people in Japan.
The above examples illustrate that one of the biggest challenges to
Japanese corporations' promotion of CSR activities has been directors'
obligation to consider how every activity of the corporation contributes
directly or indirectly to profits. It has been difficult for Japanese corporations
to develop CSR activities when they are not based on laws that would be
enforced by regulatory bodies and/or the private sector. The externalities
caused by business activities in Japan are likely to be internalized only
through enforceable laws, not through corporations' own drive for activities
that would benefit an enlarged group of corporate stakeholders.
This paper begins to explore some of these issues. Much of the debate in
Anglo-America and Continental Europe about corporate governance and
norms in Japan takes place outside ofJapan, with little access to the kinds of
policy discussions and debates that are actually occurring within Japan's
corporate world. Through collaboration between a Canadian scholar and a
Japanese scholar working withJapanese corporations and policy-makers, this
paper provides insight into the current state of Japanese corporate
governance and the discussion regarding development ofC SR activities and
norms. Part II introduces some of the elements of CSR that have been
adopted internationally, including a brief comparative reference to Canadian
law. Part III then explores why CSR has taken the particular trajectory that it
has in Japan. Part IV examines how the history and development of
corporate law has influenced or been influenced by various components of
CSR, particularly in the political and environmental arenas. Parts V and VI
then respectively examine labour law and environmental law in Japan and
their relationship to the potential for the growth of CSR.
II. ELEMENTS OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
There are a number of elements to CSR. For example, the Canadian
government has observed that CSR involves a company becoming aware of
its relationship to broader external social, environmental, and economic
interests, and publicly disclosing the external impacts caused by its business
activities-suggesting that a further step would be factoring these external
2012
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social, environmental, and economic impacts into the firm's decision-
making model. 8
Canadian scholar Aaron Dhir has suggested that there is a connection
between CSR disclosure and financial performance. 9 One can surmise from
his work that at least some investors are motivated to seek investments in
companies that demonstrate a commitment to social responsibility. The costs
associated with CSR can be viewed as an investment "with returns paid in
several different forms".2" At least in some sectors, financial institutions,
shareholders, and investors increasingly consider a company's management of
its CSR performance as a key criterion in their financial and investment
decision making.2' Community engagement can build relationships, allow
for dialogue that can resolve problems before they become regulatory or legal
problems, and enhances overall economic sustainability.22
Globally, there have been numerous policy initiatives advocating CSR.
For example, the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) suggests that
"sustainability reporting is the practice of measuring, disclosing, and being
accountable to internal and external stakeholders for organizational
performance towards the goal of sustainable development".2 3 CSR may
include substantial investment in initiatives that seek to actively contribute to
the communities that corporations work in, including investing in
environmental initiatives such as carbon-offsetting plans, building schools
18 See Industry Canada, "Business Case for CSR", online: <http://www.ic.gc.ca>.
9 Aaron A Dhir, 'Shadows and Light: Addressing Information Asymmetries through
Enhanced Social Disclosure in Canadian Securities Law" (2009) 47:2 Can Bus LJ 435 at
462,466.
20 Ibidat 466 citing David Hess, 'Social Reporting: AReflexive LawApproach to Corporate
Social Responsiveness" (1999) 25J Corp L41 at 81.
21 See e.g. Goldcorp, Human Rights and CSR Policy, online: <http://www.goldcorp.com/
About-Us/Governance/Human-Rights-CSR-Policy/default.aspx>.
22 See e.g. Teck Resources, 2011 Annual Report, online: <http://www.teck.com/
DocumentViewer.aspx ?elementld=201920>.
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and setting up educational programs in the overseas communities in which
the corporation operates, and offering microfinancing programs in the host
community to provide families and the most disadvantaged groups with
access to credit that would allow them to plan for the future rather than
focusing on day-to-day survival.24 These objectives are important and timely.
One question, however, is how to encourage directors and officers to
undertake such activities in a meaningful way, absent enforceable directives.
In Japan, there is considerable commitment to lifetime employment, as
discussed in Part V below, but the initiatives are generally focused on
domestic workers and are due to long-standing norms, rather than due to a
broader conceptualization of the corporation as a socially responsible
global citizen.
There are now also voluntary international standards set out in the 2010
ISO 26000: Guidance on Social Responsibility (ISO 26000).25 ISO 26000
links the operation of corporations in a socially responsible manner to the
objective of sustainable development, observing that
an organization's performance in relation to the society in which it operates
and to its impact on the environment has become a critical part of measuring
its overall performance and its ability to continue operating effectively. This
is, in part, a reflection of the growing recognition of the need for ensuring
healthy ecosystems, social equity and good organizational governance.
26
ISO 26000 provides guidance to corporations on definitions, trends, and
characteristics of social responsibility; principles and practices relating to
social responsibility; integrating, implementing, and promoting socially
responsible behaviour throughout the organization; identifying and engaging
with stakeholders; and communicating commitments, performance, and
24 See Heledd Jenkins & Louise Obara, "Corporate Social Responsibility in the Mining
Industry: The Risk of Corporate Dependency" (2006), online: Corporate Responsibility
Research Conference <http://www.crrconference.org>.
25 International Organization for Standardization, ISO 26000: Guidance on Social
Responsibility (Geneva: ISO, 2010) [ISO 26000].
26 Ibid at v.
2012
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other information related to social responsibility.27 ISO 26000 suggests that a
corporation's performance on social responsibility can influence competitive
advantage, reputation, employee commitment, and the ability to attract and
retain workers, members, customers, clients, users, and investors.2 lS0 26000
is intended to encourage companies to go beyond legal compliance and, at
the same time, to "take into consideration societal, environmental, legal,
cultural, political and organizational diversity, as well as differences in
economic conditions, while being consistent with international norms
of behaviour."2 9
To date, ISO 26000 has not been intended to be used for certification
purposes. It addresses seven core subjects of social responsibility: human
rights, labour practices, the environment, fair operating practices, consumer
issues, organizational governance, and community involvement and
development; 3 factors that it views as highly interdependent. ISO 26000 has
received growing attention in the business community, including among
Japanese corporations, as discussed below.
In Canada, there is no statutory requirement for CSR; however, the
government has recently stated that "Industry Canada promotes CSR
principles and practices to Canadian businesses because it makes companies
more innovative, productive, and competitive."31 While these statements are
strong normative indication of the government's commitment, it has chosen
not to regulate or legislate CSR requirements in corporate or securities law,
except for transparency requirements under securities law. There is no
requirement to internalize the costs of current externalities, such as
environmental harm, unless they fall under the ambit of environmental-
protection legislation or companion remedial statutes. Industry Canada is
making its pitch for CSRbasedon the market and reputational benefits that
may accrue to companies implementing CSR.
27 Ibid at 1.
28 Ibid at vi.
29 Ibid at 1.
30 Ibid at 19.
31 Industry Canada, supra note 18.
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A. THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY IN ADVANCING CORPORATE
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
The approach to CSR by the Canadian government received a boost in
recent years from two Supreme Court of Canada judgments that affirmed
that directors and officers hold a fiduciary obligation to manage in the best
interests of the corporation as a whole, and not to act solely to maximize
shareholder value. 32 In Peoples Department Stores (Trustee of) v Wise, the
Supreme Court held that in exercising their fiduciary obligation, corporate
officers may take into consideration the interests of multiple stakeholders,
such as employees, suppliers, creditors, consumers, government and the
environment. 33 In BCE Inc v 1976 Debentureholders, the Supreme Court
emphasized "the need to treat affected stakeholders in a fair manner,
commensurate with the corporation's duties as a responsible corporate
citizen."34 Yet the judgments do not require directors and officers to take
account of these interests and do not direct any kind of consultation
regarding what those interests might be, although arguably, the judgments
will have some effect on the previously narrowly framed shareholder-wealth-
maximization norm. There are no reported judgments subsequent to these
pronouncements that appear to have addressed whether there is any
normative shift in the behaviour of corporate decision makers.
The potential role of the judiciary in advancing CSR norms differs
considerably between Canada andJapan. Canadian courts have a tradition of
equity, embodied in oppression-remedyprovisions in corporate-law statutes,
as well as a long tradition of remedies awarded under the common law for
inequitable conduct. In contrast, it is difficult to expect Japanese courts to
make creative or expansive interpretation ofwritten laws, including tort law,
given the civil-law nature of the jurisdiction. For example, the most general
provision on tort under Japan's Civil Code, Article 709, reads, "[a] person
who has intentionally or negligently infringed any right of others, or legally
protected interest of others, shall be liable to compensate any damages
32 Peoples Department Stores v Wise, 2004 SCC 68 at para 42, [2004] 3 SCR 461.
33 Ibid at para 42.
" BCE Inc v 1976Debentureholders, 2008 SCC 69 at para 82, [2008] 3 SCR 560.
2012
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resulting in consequence."35 It could be interpreted to expand the scope of
application to activities of business corporations, but the cases are rare in
Japanese courts and judgments are almost non-existent. The exceptions
would be mass tort cases on pollution and harms due to medical side effects,
for which Japanese courts have awarded remedies.36
However, it should be emphasized that, notwithstanding the inelasticity
ofJapanese law, once corporations see the possibility of change in case law or
statutory law, they are willing to respond in a timely manner to bring their
company into compliance with any new standards of corporate activity or
labour laws, or to stay ahead of any discussion of further regulation.
Corporations could commit to implementing CSR beyond current legal
requirements if they conclude that change will be required in the near future
and it is better to voluntarily change than have standards statutorily or
judicially imposed. In Japan, ISO 26000 standards were expected to be
captured in Japanese Industrial Standards (JIS) by March of 2012; this
inclusion is driving further interest in the ISO 26000 standards.
3 7
Uncertainty of change in legal obligations or an expectation of new standards
may help to promote CSR activities, even in advance of actual legal
responsibilities.
'5 Minp6 (Civ C), art 709, translated by Japanese Law Translation, online:
<http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp>.
36 See e.g. Tsu District Court (Yokkaichi blanch) decision of24July 1972 (inJapanese), 672
Horitsu-Jiho 30 (regarding air pollution); Tsu District Court (Yokkaichi blanch) decision
of 25 June 1982 (in Japanese), 1048 Horitsu-Jiho 25 (regarding air pollution); Tokyo
District Court Decision of 18 May 1984 (in Japanese), 1118 Horitsu-Jiho 28 (regarding
side effects by immunization).
37 These standards, entitled JIS Z 2600, were published in the Official Gazette (Kanpo) on
21 March 2012.JIS Z 26000 has the same contents as ISO 26000. SeeJapanese Standards
Association, ISO 26000 Corporate Social Responsibility (in Japanese), online:
<http://www.jsa.or.jp/stdz/sr/sr.asp>; Japanese Standards Association, Newsletter,
Standards Development: Achievement in FY 2011, online: <http://www.jsa.or.jp/eng/
news/ 2 012_ .asp>.
VOL 45:3
2012 KIGYO NO SHAKAI-TEKI SEKININ
B. STATUTORY STANDARDS IN CORPORATE LAW
There are few examples of legislated CSR. The UK's Companies Act 2006
requires directors to advance the company's success for the benefit of its
members as a whole, and in doing so, directors are to have regard to the
impact of the company's operations on the community.38 The Act specifies
that directors must act in good faith, having regard for the likely
consequences of any decision in the long term, the interests of the company's
employees, the need to foster the company's business relationships with
customers and others, and the impact of the company's operations on the
community and the environment.
CSR for multinational enterprises may involve meeting the highest
international standards for environmental protection or human rights, even
if the host jurisdiction in which the company operates has considerably lower
legislative standards. Japanese corporations can adopt the highest
international standards if the standards are helpful or essential to
maintaining or developing their business relationships. Despite the long-
standing norm in Japan that corporations are unlikely to act absent
38 See Companies Act 2006 (UK), C-46, s 172 (Duty to promote the success of
the company):
(1) A director of a company must act in the way he considers, in good faith, would be most likely
to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole, and in doing so
have regard (amongst other matters) to-
(a) the likely consequences of any decision in the long term,
(b) the interests of the company's employees,
(c) the need to foster the company's business relationships with suppliers, customers
and others, (d) the impact of the company's operations on the community and
the environment,
(e) the desirability of the company maintaining a reputation for high standards of business
conduct, and
(f) the need to act fairly as between members of the company.
(2) Where or to the extent that the purposes of the company consist of or include purposes other
than the benefit of its members, subsection (1) has effect as if the reference to promoting the
success of the company for the benefit of its members were to achieving
those purposes.
(3) The duty imposed by this section has effect subject to any enactment or rule of law requiring
directors, in certain circumstances, to consider or act in the interests of creditors of the company.
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regulatory or statutory directive, the ISO 26000 guidelines are attracting
interest in the Japanese business world.According to the Nikkei newspaper in
2011, Japan's corporations have started to strengthen initiatives for CSR as
their international business strategy.3 9 Since the number of jurisdictions
that have adopted ISO 26000 is increasing, Japanese businesses are
discovering it is important to meet the standards, especially on human rights
and labour customs.
Japanese corporations may become more interested in CSR as a
mechanism for disclosure, which in turn could promote substantive
corporate activities. Key intermediates could be "comparability indicators",
allowing corporate activity discussed in annual reports required by securities
regulation to be compared with international standards, especially ISO
certification or voluntary standards, as well as evaluated by trustworthy
rating organizations." Once the comparison is facilitated between
corporations, they can easily evaluate the reputation for CSR on a
comparative basis. Considering the experience with the ISO 9000 Quality
Management Practices and ISO 14000 EnvironmentalManagement series in
Japan, corporations tend to choose those companies that have the
certification as their counterparties in order to put themselves in a keiretsu
(corporate group) with a good reputation. In that sense, standards that both
enable comparisons and are trustworthy are critical to facilitating CSR
activities in Japan.
C. TRANSPARENCY OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
THROUGH SECURITIES DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS
As noted above, there is little regulation of CSR, other than transparency
requirements. Even where jurisdictions have endorsed best-practice
39 "Enterprises strengthen CSR activities" (in Japanese), Nikkei Newspaper (24 August
2011) (on file with author Nakahigashi).
40 See Yasuhiko Kubota, L A)4±= ,A (Corporate Social Responsibility) (2007) 51
Shojihou kenkyu at 10, 14-15.
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standards, they require only that corporations comply or explain,4' as
opposed to any substantive compliance. Hence, one issue is whether
transparency requirements themselves have a normative influence on
implementation of CSR.
Transparency of CSR activities may create some normative pressure for
corporations to adopt them. There are reputational considerations, and, as
Dhir noted above, there is arguably a growing number of investors that have
either expressed a preference for C SR or have concluded that CSR may be an
indicium of more effective corporate-governance structures generally.
42
Canadian securities laws have relatively recently imposed several disclosure
requirements on publicly traded companies that identify some CSR-type
initiatives or lack thereof.
The requirements for the Annual Information Form (AIF) under
Canadian National Instrument 51-102, Continuous Disclosure Obligations,
expanded the scope of disclosure effective in 2008, based on regulators'
conclusions that increased transparency will continue to make Canadian
listed corporations competitive in international markets.43 They require that
the company report, for each reportable segment of the business, the
financial and operational effects of environmental-protection requirements
on the capital expenditures, earnings, and competitive position of the
company in the current financial year and the expected effect in future
years.'4 They require disclosure of any social or environmental policies the
company has implemented that are fundamental to its operations, such as
policies regarding its relationship with the environment, its relationship with
the communities in which it does business, and human rights. The company
4 An example is Canadian securities law. See e.g. NP 58-201: Corporate Governance
Guidelines, online: TMX <http://www.tmx.com>.
42 Dhir, supra note 19 at 462.
41 Canadian Securities Administrators, NationalInstrument51-102: ContinuousDisclosure
Obligations, online: Ontario Securities Commission <http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/
13342.htm>.
44 Canadian Securities Administrators, Form 51-102F:Annual Information Form, s 5(k)




must describe the policies and the steps that it has taken to implement them.
The company must also disclose risk factors relating to its business, such as
cash flow and liquidity problems (if any), experience of management, the
general risks inherent in the business carried on by the company,
environmental and health risks, reliance on key personnel, regulatory
constraints, economic or political conditions, financial history, and any other
matter that would be likely to influence an investor's decision to purchase
securities of the company. If there is a risk that security holders may become
liable to make an additional contribution beyond the price of the security,
the company must also disclose that risk.45 The instructions for the AIF
suggest that the company is to disclose the risks in order of seriousness, from
the most serious to the least serious, and that a risk factor must not be de-
emphasized by including excessive caveats or conditions.46 The measures are
aimed at investor protection, by allowing investors to make informed
decisions regarding the risk-management strategies of directors and officers,
rather than at any CSR initiative.
Also in Canada, the Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) of
each publicly traded corporation is to discuss both positive and negative de-
velopments and any material changes since the last reporting period, as well
as future financial and operating plans and any risks to solvency.4 7
Management is to disclose any factors that have affected the value ofprojects,
such as changes in commodity prices or land use, or political or
environmental issues.48 While there are no express standards imposed,
securities regulators' guidelines as to what might be material changes serve as
a type of normative reference as to best or better practices.
Moreover, in October 2010, the Canadian Securities Administrators
published Staff Notice 51-333, Environmental Reporting Guidance, to
provide guidance on continuous-disclosure requirements relating to
41 Ibid, s 5.2.
46 Ibid, s 5.2(i).
47 The objective of the MD&A is to provide a descriptive analysis of the information
contained purely in accounting form in the financial statements.
48 Canadian Securities Administrators, Form 51-102F1: Managements Discussion &
Analysis, s 1.4, online: Ontario Securities Commission <http://www.osc.gov.on.ca>.
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environmental matters.49 The MD&A is to include a discussion of potential
material environmental liabilities and whether or not the liability has been
accrued in the financial statements or has been disclosed in the notes to the
statements."0 If an asset retirement obligation (ARO) is material to the
company, the company is to provide supplemental disclosure in its MD&A,
indicating the associated asset to be reclaimed or restored and information
about applicable environmental-remediation costs, provided such
information is reasonably available.5" The CSA Notice also states that, in
most cases,ARO are critical accounting estimates and should be analyzed in
the MD&A."2 For mining companies, there is enhanced disclosure in this
respect.5 3 National Instrument 43-101, Standards ofDisclosure for Mineral
Projects, sets out disclosure standards specific to mineral projects. 4 A
company's technical report must include a general discussion of the extent to
which the estimate of mineral resources and mineral reserves may be
materially affected by any known environmental, socio-economic, political,
or other relevant issues.5
The requirement for disclosure could be a first step in getting companies
to think about what social and environmental risks there may be to their
activities, as well as the appropriate responses. It is unclear whether the
requirement to disclose social and environmental risks will be generalized to
other aspects of CSR activities. However, arguably, social and environmental
49 Canadian Securities Administrators, CSA StaffNotice 51-333 Environmental Reporting





53 Canadian Securities Administrators, National Instrument 43-101: Standards of
Disclosure for Mineral Projects, online: Ontario Securities Commission <http://www.
osc.gov.on.ca>.
5 Canadian Securities Administrators, National Instrument 43-101: Standards ofDisclosure





risks comprise a fairly broad category of conduct that should be addressed in
a meaningful way. Investor response to these risks, and in particular, the
failure to address any such material risks, may generate some pressure to
adopt CSR initiatives. However, in Canada, the only shareholders with
sufficient clout to cause such a governance shift would be institutional
shareholders, who may or may not have such an interest, depending on the
source of their capital, the short- versus long-term time horizon for their
investment, and any prudential obligations they may have in terms of
investment decisions.
This shift in Canadian disclosure requirements aligns with changes to
U.S. securities regulation. A U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) Interpretation issued in 2010 expressly includes disclosure of social
and environmental policies, as well as risk factors such as environmental and
health risks and political considerations.56 The required standard of
disclosure of social or environmental policies is that the policies are
fundamental to operations, expanding the threshold for the inclusion of
information. The requirement is summarized by SEC Chair Schapiro
as follows:
It is neither surprising nor especially remarkable for us to conclude that of
course a company must consider whether potential legislation-whether
that legislation concerns climate change or new licensing requirements-is
likely to occur. If so, then under our traditional framework the company
must then evaluate the impact it would have on the company's liquidity,
capital resources, or results of operations, and disclose to shareholders when
that potential impact will be material. Similarly, a company must disclose the
significant risks that it faces, whether those risks are due to increased
competition or severe weather. These principles of materiality form the
bedrock of our disclosure framework.57
56 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure
Related to Climate Change: Release Nos. 33-9106; 34-61469; ER-82, online: SEC
<http://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2010/33-9106.pdf>.
57 Mary Schapiro, Statement Before the Open Commission Meeting on Disclosure Related to
Business or Legislative Events on the Issue of Climate Change (Speech by SEC Chairman,




Another element of CSR is that socially responsible policies can be seen
as a mechanism to retain and attract employees. Professor Kellye Testy has
observed that, in the United States, young adults in the 18-25 age group
report that focus on the public good is one of the motivating factors in their
consideration of employment opportunities. 58 There have not yet been any
studies on why this preference is turning up, and there is a live question as to
whether CSR considerations would be sufficient for younger employees to
forego particular income opportunities. One hypothesis might be that young
adults understand that CSR policies should include appropriate conditions
of employment, particularly given the increasing uncertainty about medium-
to long-term economic security. Otherwise, they might prefer to take a better
salary and then donate a part of their income to more specific socially
responsible activities undertaken by NGO or environmental organizations
that they support, possibly with a commensurate tax reduction.
III. CONVENTIONAL CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
ACTIVITIES IN JAPAN
A. INTRODUCTORY FEATURES OF CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITYACTIVITIES
In the past, CSR activities in Japan were often interpreted as costs that came
with social obligations of corporations. In recent years, awareness has been
spreading that promoting CSR can be compatible with corporate
profitability.5 9This part discusses recent CSR activities as a basis on which to
analyze the current challenges for CSR by Japan's corporations. The
following part will then offer an historical perspective for the particular
trajectory of CSR in the Japanese context.
18 Kellye Testy, "Never Waste a Crisis: Corporate Social Responsibility in a "Down"
Economy", UBC Lecture for National Centre for Business Law, 7 February 2010)
(written remarks not available, cited with permission).
5 For the change of recognition by corporations, see Ministry of Economy, Trade and
Industry (METI) (Japan), White Paper on International Economy and Trade 2004:
Towards a "New Value Creation Economy" at 102, online: <http://www.meti.go.jp/




1. CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY REPORTS
In Japan, disclosure of CSR initiatives has grown for corporations listed on
the First Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE), even though such
disclosure is not required bylaw. The drivers for such change are the need for
Japanese corporations to compete globally, disclosure listing requirements for
companies that are cross-listed on NorthAmerican or European exchanges,6"
and the realization that corporations operating internationally will be
assessed for the transparency of their social and environmental risks, and
their activities to respond to those risks. There exist several online databases
for the reports, with rankings.61
Professor Katsuhiko Kokubo has found that there is a big difference
between C SR-type reports by Japanese corporations and those in Europe and
North America.62 He observes:
What a corporation should tell readers, i.e., the readers or stakeholders in the
corporation, is its attitude or mission for CSR activities to stakeholders....
Looking at the reports byAnglo-American corporations that are famous for
their CSR activities, they describe the mission and the sufficient strategies to
realize them, and show the strategies in each field of activity and the
consistency in their policies. 63
In his analysis, Kokubo states that the reports in Japan tend to describe
whatever sounds good to them and not whatever sounds unfeasible, such as
corporate opportunism. He suggests that they pretend to be interested in
CSR activities beyond their own benefits, but they lack established
guidelines for the form and content of the reports. Rather, the reports look
60 See e.g. London Stock Exchange, Corporate Governance: A Practical Guide, online:
<http://www.londonstockexchange.com/companies-and-advisors/listing/guide-
corporate-governance.pdf>.
61 See e.g. Nippon Foundation, CANPAN CSR +, online: <http://canpan.info/
csr list searchen.do>.
62 Katsuhiko Kokubo, -7 ftL L" (Things Needed in
Order to Encourage People to Read CSR Reports) (2011) 578 Gekkan-Kansayaku 132.
61 Ibid at 132.
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eager to express to stakeholders that their business activities are useful and
worthwhile to those stakeholders, society, and the environment.
According to scores given by CANPAN CSR Plus64 on CSR activities,
mainly based on the CSR reports, the highly scored Japanese corporations
are categorized in industries such as manufacturing, electric power, and
construction. A common feature of these businesses is that their products are
well known to customers/consumers nationally and internationally under
their brand names (e.g., Hitachi, Sekisui Chemical, Tokyo Gas, Panasonic,
Richoh, Olympus, Fujitsu, Kyushu Electric Power, Sapporo, Sekisui House,
Sony, NEC, Mazda, Toshiba, Canon, Nikon, Kansai Electric, and
Osaka Gas). The implication that their corporate brand and names are
important to their business and the profits generated, so they can justify
CSR-type activities.
2. SURVEYAND PROJECT BY NIKKEI
A survey in 2010 undertaken by the Nikkei newspaper, Japan's version of The
Wall Street Journal or the Financial Times, shows the same tendency
regarding environmental activities.65 In the survey, manufacturers that supply
their products to consumers are highly rated. The first-rated corporation is
Panasonic, which was also highest rated in the previous year's survey. The
other top 10 corporations in manufacturing industries are Mitsubishi
Electric, Toshiba, Sharp, Toyota Motor Corporation, NEC, Ricoh, Denso,
Toyoda Gosei, and Fujifilm. Among them, the businesses of Denso and
Toyoda Gosei do not sell their products directly to end-users. However, these
two corporations are in the Toyota group and are supplying their products
(i.e., car parts) to Toyota Motor Corporation. The results would indicate
that these corporations are interested in environmentally oriented
management mainly to increase profits. Customers have been very sensitive
to price and so-called "eco-car tax reduction" or "green tax" and "eco-points",
64 CAlNPAN CSR + is a website designated to help companies and citizens communicate
about CSR by providing a database about corporations'efforts to improve CSR. See supra
note 61. The score in the text is as of 19 February 2011.
65 Nikkei, Reporton Survey ofEnvironment OrientedManagement Index (2010), highlights
given in Nikkei (30 January 2011) 1; Nikkei Sangyo (31 January 2011, 1 February 2011) 1.
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which are equivalent to money by the government, 66 and in turn increase the
demand for cars and other green products used by consumers.67Interestingly,
the eco-point system is within the cojurisdiction of the Minister ofEconomy,
Trade, and Industry (METI), the Ministry of the Environment (MOE),
and the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC).68
This collaboration would suggest that the system is also considered an
important strategy to promote industry, especially research and development
(R&D) activities.
Komatsu, whose main businesses are manufacturing and sale of
construction and miningequipment, utilities, forest machines, and industrial
machinery, has viewed a forthcoming regulation on particulate matter and
nitrogen oxide as an important business opportunity.69 According to the
Nikkei Sangyo newspaper, Komatsu is brushing up strength in monozukuri,
the Japanese way of manufacturing, especially the promotion of core
manufacturing technology.7" It has concluded that the R&D activities
promoting ecological products will make Japan's corporations competitive in
a global market.
In 2010, Nikkei started the Global Social Responsibilities Study Meeting
(GSR) under the following initiatives:
GSR isa new concept developed in Japan tbat goes beyond conventional notions
ofcorporate responsibility, such as legal compliance and risk management. It is a
way of thinking that focuses on "aggressive CSR[,] proactive behaviors
66 "What to Look for in Eco-friendly Cars" (inJapanese), NikkeiNewspaper (25June 2012)
(on file with author Nakahigashi).
67 "Toyoto Prius Sales Top Two Million Units" (in Japanese), NikkeiNewspaper (9 October
2010) (on file with author Nakahigashi).
68 Ibid.
69 "Self-manufacturing: Ecological Products Enriched" (in Japanese), Nikkei Sangyo
Newspaper (1 February 2011) (on file with author Nakahigashi).
70 For details on Japanese manufacturing (monozukuri), see Ministry ofEconomy, Trade and
Industry, Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare & Ministry of Education, Culture,
Sports, Science and Technology (Japan), Summary ofthe Wbite Paper on Manufacturing
Industries (Monozukuri) 2010, online: <http://www.meti.go.jp/english/report/data/
Monodzukuri2010_02.pdf>.
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aimed at bringing about a better society. Under this concept, companies
collaborate globally with governments and civil society in working within
their business processes to resolve global issues, such by reducing carbon
dioxide emissions and developing renewable energy to combat global
warming, taking steps to reduce poverty, and acting to address water issues.
Corporations are in a position to play a major role in resolving global
issues and problems relating to the governance of the global community, and
the number of companies in Japan addressing such issues from a business
perspective is gradually increasing.
At the same time, bodies like the United Nations and its affiliated
organizations, NG Os, and NPOs have been initiating collaborative activities
with global companies around the world at a tremendous rate, based on a
recognition that cooperation with the business world is indispensable. In this
sense, GSR is set to become an essential element of corporate management in
the global age.
At the GSR Study Meetings, case studies are presented not just of GSR
and philanthropic activities carried out from a corporate perspective but also
of companies working to resolve global issues through their main business
activities. These case studies pave the way for discussion and investigation of
norms of conduct for global companies. 71
Interestingly, the first sentence illustrates that conventional notions of
C SR in Japan have been limited to legal compliance and risk management. In
other words,Japan's corporations have been recognizing CSR as a matter of
risk management, not as one of corporate citizenship.
B. WHITE PAPER ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMYAND TRADE 2004
In 2004, when the Japanese stock market was recovering from the burst of its
bubble economy, METI published its WhitePaper on InternationalEconomy
and Trade 2004. It appears to be the only volume mentioning C SR, although
METI publishes the white paper every year. The heading for CSR activities
was "The value creation capacity of companies and 'Corporate Social




Responsibility' (CSR)".72 The paper raises the issue ofwhy "the value creation
capacity of companies and CSR could be compatible "
73
In a general statement, the white paper introduces statistics that indicate
recognition by the management ofJapan's corporations of CSR's relationship
to profits that exceeds the global average among other jurisdictions:
... CSR in the past was often interpreted as costs that came with social
obligations of companies. In recent years, the awareness has been spreading
that promoting CSR can be compatible with corporate profitability. For
example, as Figure 2.1.2074 shows, many corporate managers believe that
performing CSR is not simply a part of public relations activities but that it
has a high priority in corporate management and is vital to corporate
profitability. Managers who believe that CSR is essential for corporate
profitability account for as much as 79 percent of the total in Japan, and 68
percent globally.75
The white paper proposes three answers to the above question, the last
one being most relevant for the purposes of this paper.76 It reads:
72 METI, White Paper on International Economy and Trade, supra note 59 at 102.
71 Ibid at 103.
74 "Figure 2.1.20 Awareness of the importance of CSR by managers (Japan/other
countries)" in ibid at 104 citingYotaro Kobayashi et al"The 15th Corporate White Paper
on 'Market Evolution'and 'CSR Management': Toward Building Integrity and Creating
Stakeholder Value", online: Japan Association of Corporate Executives <http://www.
doyukai.or.jp/en/policyproposals/2002/030326.html>; PricewaterhouseCoopers,"5th
Annual Global CEO Survey: Uncertain Times, Abundant Opportunities,
online: <http://www.thesmithfamily.com.au/webdata/resources/files/PwC-Global_
CEO_Survey.pdf>.
75 METI, White Paper on International Economy and Trade, supra note 59 at 103-04.
76 Ibid at 103-05; The White Paper suggests:
The first reason is that there is an overlap between CSR and investment in intellectual assets
designed to increase company value .... For example, the promotion of human capital and the
building of a good network with customers as investment in intellectual assets are regarded from
the viewpoint of CSR as companies' social responsibility for employees
and customers.
For the second reason, when intellectual assets are understood in terms of building processes to
increase company value, these same processes contribute to CSR as well. For example, good
corporate governance, as discussed earlier, not only leads to favorable corporate profitability but
also is conducive to environmental management and compliance that are part of CSR[:]
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The promotion ofCSR leads to building the distinct character of a company
as a source of competitiveness. As companies need to become distinct in the
wake of the changes in the environment of competition, companies' efforts
to address C SR issues on the strength of their uniqueness leads to continued
support from stakeholders through the sharing of values with stakeholders
such as customers, shareholders and employees.77
Even considering that the statement is a view of METI, the basic idea
of CSR in Japan has been deemed to be profit maximization through
risk management.
Following publication of the white paper of 2004, in 2008 the world
economy underwent a significant downturn, andjapanese corporations faced
numerous management obstacles, including the strongyen and higher crude-
oil prices. During that period, directors and officers ofJapanese corporations
could not realize two types of sustainability at the same time. Interestingly,
the METI did not express the same active message regarding CSR in its
white papers of 2005 or later. There may have been concern that if the METI
prioritized the sustainability of society, it would harm the sustainability of
corporations, which would be sued by shareholders for damages or would be
taken over by other persons who would prioritize the sustainability of the
corporation. In this economic situation, directors have been willing to
maintain only the sustainability of their corporation, a trend unlikely to
change unless there are written and clear statutory or regulatory provisions
directing them or encouraging them to pursue the sustainability of society.
For legislators and regulators in Japan, in this situation it may be difficult to
obligate the private sector to promote CSR activities that impose burdens on
corporations. As noted above, directors will not place burdens on their
corporations without clear benefits or legal indications in a downward
economic situation.
C. SUMMARY
In summary, conventional CSR activities by Japan's corporations can been





welfare purposes apart from their economic benefits. Certainly, this way of
thinking by Japan's corporations does not necessarily mean that people in
Japan are not interested in non-profit activities, ecology, and other social and
environmental sustainability issues. There exist many non-profit
organizations and other bodies that are committed to improving both local
and global society. However, people might not expect to contribute to
socially important goals through business corporations incorporated in
Japan. Rather, Japanese citizens, especially employees of business
corporations, have been eager to directly receive more beneficial and
protective treatment from their corporations, essentially expecting business
corporations to be successful in respect of the profitability and sustainability
of their business.
IV. JAPAN'S CORPORATE LAW ON CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY
A. INTRODUCTION
Article 1 of Japan's Companies Act, enacted in 2005, specifies that the
"formation, organization, operation and management of companies shall be
governed by the provisions of this Act, except as otherwise provided by other
acts."78 Corporate law, a part of the former Commercial Code and now the
Companies Act,79 has been considered the statutory framework for the
formation and activities of business corporations, and not as law that directly
regulates their conduct.8" Such regulations are expected to be found in the
fields of labour law, environment law, and other remedial legislation.
7 CompaniesAct ( 4 M) (-W ,-_Q M EM V ),Act No 86, art 1, translated
by Japanese Law Translation, online: <http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp>.
71 Until the enactment of Companies Act of 2005, corporate law was encoded in the
Commercial Code.
0 The Companies Act does not specify the purpose of business corporations, but it does
provide that shareholders shall have "[tihe right to receive dividends of surplus" and
"[t]he right to receive distribution of residual assets", even if the articles of incorporation
provide otherwise. See Companies Act, supra note 78, art 105(l)-(2).
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This separation of the scope and purpose of corporate and remedial laws
is related to both Japan's traditional bureaucratic government and the fact
that there exists no specific definition of CSR in Japan. In such a situation,
managers ofJapan's corporations can undertake CSR activities in the limited
scope either of what they think beneficial to their corporation directly or
indirectly, or because specific laws require the corporation to obey. Once the
specific statutes, ordinances, or other legal regulations require specific
conduct by corporations, management has to follow the regulations, as it is
their fiduciary duty to ensure the corporation complies with corporate law.
When Japan's business people discuss CSR, the major concerns relate to
employment, consumer welfare, and the environment. In terms of consumers,
product safety has been considered by the relevant government agencies,
8
'
and a large number of lawsuits brought by victims have facilitated the
government's response." The civil actions have also resulted in monitoring
and arguably have influenced the activities of corporations where they bear
the costs of monetary damages, loss of sales due to negative reputational
effects, et cetera. In that sense, it can be said that the law and society have had
some success in making business corporations conscious of this kind of CSR.
Unless specific regulations exist, managers are expected to enhance corporate
value (i.e., shareholder value) using their business judgment. The next parts
of this paper focus on two specific aspects of CSR: employee protection and
environmental protection. The former has been an objective traditionally
and the latter is a rather new target that has come under corporate
governance in the past two decades.
81 See e.g. Consumer Affairs Agency, Jurisdiction of Consumer Affairs Agency, online:
<http://www.caa.go.jp/en/index.html>; Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare,
Household Product Safety Measures, online: <http://www.mhlw.go.jp/english>.
82 See also Part VI, below.
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B. HISTORY OF CORPORATE LAW IN THE CONTEXT OF CORPORATE
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
1. SOCIAL PROBLEMS REGARDING ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION IN
THE 1950S AND 1960s
After World War II ended in 1945, Japan was under occupation by the
General Headquarters/Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers
(GHQ/SCAP) until 1952. Initially, the GHQ/SCAP tried to diminish the
powers of zaibatsu, which was the dominant form of corporate group in
Japan at the time and was considered to have facilitated the war by funding
and supplying products. In the middle of the dissolution of zaibatsu, the
GHQ/SCAP changed its stance to one of restrengtheningJapan's industries;
this shift was due to the Korean War beginning in 1950 and the need for
production allies. It was a restart of development ofJapan's economy.
Predictably, Japan began to face social and health problems associated
with pollution because of the emergent development of heavy industries.83
Many lawsuits were filed in court against major corporations and the
government for tort damages, and citizens' movements for CSR in the field
began to be widely recognized and well organized.84 They succeeded in
making legislators establish the Environmental Pollution Prevention Act in
1967, which was consolidated into the Basic Environment Law in 1993.85
Because of the litigation and consequent legislation, corporations causing
pollution were required to internalize environmental risk and damage within
their risk-management practices. However, it was very probable that the
corporations considered the externalities to the extent of their legal liabilities
and negative impact to their businesses, such as loss of reputational capital
and costs to respond to lawsuits and environmental-protection movements.
There is still no evidence to show that corporations have any duty to prevent
83 See e.g. Cases listed at supra note 36 at Tsu District Court (Yokkaichi blanch).
84 See generally, Ministry of the Environment (Japan), White Paper on Pollution in Japan
1969 (in Japanese), online: <http://www.env.go.jp/policy/hakusyo/hakusyo.php3?
kid=144>.
8 See Ministry of the Environment (Japan), "The Basic Environmental Law-Outline",
online: <http://www.env.go.jp/en/laws/policy/basic/leaflet2.html>.
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pollution in excess of the expected loss; typically under the Learned Hand
formula (i.e., the estimated amount of damages corporations will be liable for
from possible tort litigation multiplied by the estimated possibility of
losing)86 will be lower than the certain cost to avoid pollution.
2. CONTRIBUTION TO POLITICAL PARTIES AND ULTRA VIRES
One of the biggest tensions regarding CSR in Japan has involved
contributions to political parties. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)
dominated Japan's politics for 38 years, since 195 5, its governance referred to
as the "55-year system "" Many large corporations were willing to make
contributions to LDP, given its stability as a political force. Shareholders in
Yawata Iron & Steel, now Nippon Steel after its merger with Fuji Iron &
Steel, commenced a derivative action against the directors for damages on
the ground that political contributions were ultra vires private corporations 88
In 1970, the Supreme Court ofJapan gave a judgment for defendants. The
Court concluded that political contributions by private corporations are
expected because they are bodies existing in society; therefore, their political
contributions are within the scope of corporate legal power and are not ultra
vires.89 Second, the Supreme Court held that such contributions do not
constitute a breach of directors' duties if they are within reasonable limits,
considering factors such as corporate scale, financial condition, and amount
of the contribution.90
86 See United States v Carrol Towing Co, 159 F 2d 169 (2d Cir 1947).
87 See Ellis S Krauss & RobertJ Pekkanen, "The Rise and Fall ofJapan's Liberal Democratic
Party" (2010) 69:1 The Journal of Asian Studies 5 at 6.
88 Plaintiff shareholders also argued that political contributions were unconstitutional since
they would disturb freedom of expression of shareholders and people in general. See
Supreme Court Decision of24June 1970, 24:6 Minshu 625 (in most cases, the names of
plaintiffs and defendants are not published; therefore, typically the court's name and date
of judgment are used to specify the case).




In 1948, prior to the judgment, the PoliticalFunds ControlAct had been
established (which has been amended many times subsequently). 9' In Japan,
political contributions by business corporations to political parties are not
flatly banned, but there are limitations imposed on the amount.2 The Act is
premised on the assumption that corporations' political contributions are
harmonized to Japan's system of governance, and that too many
contributions might be harmful to the Japanese norms regardingprotection
of society because they would influence public policy in favour of the rich
or privileged.
3. CORPORATE LAW REFORM DISCUSSION FORTHEAMENDMENT
IN 1981
In 1974, theJapanese Commercial Code,9 3which provided the corporate-law
regime until the establishment of the Companies Act of 2005, was amended
to regulate misrepresentations in the financial statements of publicly listed
corporations, also called "creative accounting" in Japan.94 The most famous
case in respect of misrepresentation was Sanyo Special Steel Co Ltd.95 The
9' Political Funds Control Act, Act No 194 of 1948 (in Japanese), online: e-Gov
<http://aw.e-gov.go.jp/htmldata/S23/S23HO194.html> (subsequent major changes
were by Act No 64 of 1975, Act No 4 of 1994 and Act No of 135 of 2007).
92 Ibid, art 21-3.
93 Commercial Code, Law No 48/1899, art 266-3, etc. before the amendment. In addition,
in 1974, Act on SpecialProvisions on the Commercial Code ConcerningAudits, etc. of Stock
Companies (
Law No 22/1974, was newly enacted.
94 See e.g. Kazuyuki Suda, "Creative Accounting and Accounting Scandals in Japan" in
Michael Jones, ed, Creative Accounting: Fraud and InternationalAccounting Standards
(West Sussex: John Wiley & Sons, 2011) ch 14.
9' The expression of"window dressing" is often used in the United States as well as in Japan,
although it is not clearly defined legal terminology. See e.g. Jean Eaglesham &Justin Baer,
"SEC to Target Bank 'Window Dressing", Financial Times (18 September 2010) 4;
Michael Rapoport, "Regulators to Target 'Window Dressing'", The Wall StreetJournal
(16 September 2010) Al. For the proposal mentioned by the SEC, see Securities and
Exchange Commission, "17 CFR Parts 229 and 249 Short-Term Borrowings Disclosure:
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main focus of the amendments was accounting and enhancing the audit
system.At the same time, during discussion of the amendments, both houses
of the Diet declared supplementary resolutions, which required
consideration of CSR in further legislation." The resolutions illustrate the
Diet's concern about the problems of pollution and employee protection in
corporate activities, as well as the social welfare and benefits of stakeholders
generally. Generally, supplementary resolutions are very abstract and are not
deemed to be a part of the law in Japan; rather, they indicate points to be
discussed in a future Diet session.
Acting in correspondence with growing awareness of the issues, the Office
of Directors of the Ministry ofJustice's CivilAffairs Bureau started to discuss
further amendments to the Commercial Code, which were subsequently
enacted in 198 1. As the first step for discussion of corporate-law reform, in
1975 the Office distributed "Points of Discussion" to the affiliated
organizations,97 soliciting their opinions.98 In terms of CSR, it suggested two
directions for amendments. The first was to add a general provision on CSR,
which would require corporations and their directors to consider
Proposed Rule" (28 September 2010), online: SEC <http://www.sec.gov/rules/
proposed/2010/33-9143fr.pdf>.
96 See Supplementary Resolution by the Committee on Judicial Affairs, the House of
Representatives on 3 July 1973, online: National Diet of Japan <http://
kokkai.ndl.go.jp>; Supplementary Resolution by the Committee on Judicial Affairs, the
House of Councillors on 21 February 1971, online: National Diet of Japan
<http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp>.
97 Organizations affiliated to (or interested in) the future amendment of the Commercial
Code, e.g., economic federations, stock exchanges, universities,Japan Corporate Auditors
Association, bar associations (national, i.e., Japan Federation of Bar Associations, and
domestic bar associations in prefectures), Japan Federation of Certified Public Tax
Accountants'Associations, and Japanese Institute of Certified Public Accountants.
98 Ministry of Justice, Civil Affairs Bureau, Office of the Director,
" 1 - -f79l i . (Discussion Points on the Corporate-Law
Amendment) (1975) 704 Sh6ji-h6mu 6. For the purpose and background of the hearing,
see Makoto Yazawa et al, "t, (Discussion Points on
Corporate Social Responsibility) (1975) 705 Sh6ji-h6mu at 2-7. See also Kubota, supra
note 40.
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stakeholders. The second was to add specific provisions to be obeyed by
corporations in specific laws besides the Commercial Code.
Regarding the first potential option, there were strong objections by
corporate-law scholars as well as business associations.99 The reasons
presented were, first, that corporate law should consist of rules to balance the
conflicting interests of shareholders and creditors, and that corporations
should pursue the maximization of corporate value. Second, social welfare
and stakeholders'protection should be realized by other legal regimes, such
as labour law, human rights law, and environmental law. Third, the view was
that once corporations could be expected to pursue public purposes-as with
the Stock-ct of 1937 in Germany under Nazism, whose related provision was
deleted by German legislators in 1965 °0-dictators might restrict private
business activities by corporations. Finally, if management was required to
consider public policy while running corporations, it would allow them to
conduct the corporation's activities with very wide discretion. The view was
that anything besides transactions with conflicts of interest would not
99 For opinions submitted to the Ministry of Justice (MOJ), see MOJ, ed,
=$± &I]EP[ Qt7D-#"-. (Opinions and Issues on the Corporate Law
Amendment) (1976) 728 Sh6ji-h6mu 37; Takeo Suzuki, "J I < 9) i-t" (History Is
Repeated) (1975) 578 Jurist 10; Akio Takeuchi,
" ±" J q l.{IlC t-] z 6"- . D09 " (The Appropriateness of
General Provisions in the Commercial Code on Corporate Social Responsibility) (1976)
722 Sh6ji-h6mu 33. Professors Takeuchi and Suzuki were prominent commentators who
were opposed to the introduction of general provisions on CSR. For commentary by
supporters, see Jiro Matsuda, "±Q±z~J 'T lC '- " (Corporate Social
Responsibility) (1975) 713 Shrji-hamu 22 (Mr. Matsuda was a former judge of the
Supreme Court ofJapan).Also, for useful articles on the outline and history ofdiscussion
on CSR by strongly supportive scholars, see e.g. Toshikazu Suenaga,
"1 " (Corporate Social Responsibility), in Shigeru Morimoto,
Kawahama Noboru & Maeda Masahiro, eds, A.Ao"L 4 ' mf L ]RA 9 V{ :
(Corporate Soundness and Liabilities of Directors) (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1997) 140;
Kazuhiko Nakamura, - "
7, g-" (From Corporate Social Responsibility to Corporate Governance Theory)
(2002) 22 Daito Bunka University H6gaku-kenkyujo-h6 7.
'0' Aktiengesetz [AktG] [Stock Corporation Act], 30 January 1937, RGBL I S 107,
art 70 s 1.
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constitute a breach of directors' duties under such an approach, and there
were concerns about the incentive effects this approach would have.''
In contrast, the second direction, which was to add specific provisions to
existing laws, was basically supported, although some objections existed.'02 In
practice, this option would bring no direct, material changes to the situation.
Probably due to the limited and indirect effects, most advocates for
corporate-law reform did not become interested in this idea, regardless of
whether they supported strong regulation of corporate activities or opposed
additional regulation. 10 3 Provisions deemed to advance public policies in
Japan have traditionally been recognized as belonging to public law,
including labour and environmental law, which is considered the proper
domain to regulate relationships between the state and private actors. Until
remedial protection is set as a legal obligation of corporations, directors do
not have to obey under their fiduciary duty to the corporation. Ultimately,
no provisions on CSR were introduced to the Commercial Code with the
1981 amendments. This choice can also be explained in part by the
ambiguous scope of CSR in Japan, as discussed further below.
4. TREND OF HOSTILE TAKEOVERS IN 1970s AND 1980S
In the 1970s and 1980s,Japan's corporations faced a considerable increase
in hostile-takeover attempts by raiders who purchased a bulk of shares in
target corporations. These developments included a number of takeover
attempts by foreign entities. The most famous case was when Thomas Boone
Pickens Jr. bought a large number of shares in Koito Manufacturing, which
"' See Takeuchi, supra note 98 at 40.
102 Sec supra note 97.
103 See chapters by various authors in Masafumi Nakahigashi & Hideyuki Matsui, eds,
ta¢Dit9 (Selections of Corporate Law) (Tokyo: Sh6ji-h6mu, 2010). This book
analyzes the transformation of corporate law in Japan from the perspective of the actors
involved in the reform. These actors include government, scholars, investors, managers,
employees, consumers, and local societies, who all try to realize their interests/benefits
through legislation. As described later, the Legislative Council under the Ministry of
Justice has been a traditional place where the actors present their opinions and discuss
them with each other to achieve the best results.
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belonged to Toyota Group.'0 4 In fact, it was not really a hostile takeover but
was considered "greenmail" During these takeover activities, management
tried to seek defensive measures, including tightening ofcross-shareholding.
At the same time, they looked forward to more flexible interpretations of
exemptions for stock repurchases, which before 2001 were prohibited (with
limited exemptions) under Commercial Code article 210.105 Furthermore,
they started to expect amendments to the Code that would enable
corporations to buy back their shares, although they had to wait for such
amendments until 2001. Effective in 2001, corporations could buy back their
shares by following the related provisions and regulations of the Commercial
Code or Companies Act.°6 The major regulations address these procedures,
such as shareholder meetings, permitting tag-along rights for all
shareholders, and takeover bids. Depending heavily on which scheme is
chosen, they create relatively complicated requirements."7 Other regulations
address substantive issues, such as limitations on the amount of money that
can flow out from corporations, which is a creditor-protection mechanism.0 8
Some corporate-law scholars proposed new interpretations of the
exemptions to let corporations defend themselves against a buy-up of a large
number of their shares.'0 9 Professor Akira Morita appears to have been the
strongest proponent for such a flexible interpretation.1 0 Interestingly, his
main work is on CSR, as he is the well-known author of SocialResponsibility
104 See"Voluble and overblown manner ofMr. Pickens" (inJapanese),NikkeiNewspaper (21
May 2008, evening edition).
105 Commercial Code, supra note 92, art 210; Companies Act, supra note 77, arts 155-65.
106 Ibid.
107 See ibid, art 461, sl.
108 Ibid.
109 See e.g.AkiraMorita,",V Nf. & - L -C 0) n E AIM P - -5tW
(Stock Buyback as an Emergency Evacuation: Measures against Greenmailers) (1990)
20:3-4 Kobe Gakuin Hougaku 61 (495) [Morita, "Stock Buyback as an Emergency
Evacuation"]; AkiraMorita," n EM-YR t4 . 1EO -K) t' 'C" (ADiscussion
on Deregulating the Bans on Stock Buyback) (1991) 43:4 Doshisha H6gaku 1 (567).
o See ibid.
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of Modern Corporations."' He proposed an ambitious interpretation,
suggesting that a target corporation that buys up its shares is covered by the
exemption permitting a corporation to exercise its rights under Commercial
Code article 210, item 3, if it is done to protect stakeholders, especially its
employees. 1 2 In spite of his efforts, Morita's interpretation was not generally
accepted in practice or by corporate-law scholars. One reason was that
directors repurchasing the stocks illegally would be liable for breach of their
fiduciary obligations,'1 3 because stock buyback means payback to
shareholders, and, from the viewpoint of protection of creditors under the
limited-liability regime, strict limitations should be set on that kind of
outflow of cash or assets.
Above all, the critical responses to the position in favour of using stock
repurchases were that it would give broad discretion to the target
management, allowing their possible entrenchment, and that it would
facilitate greenmailers' requests to buy back their shares, in contrast to the
original idea. No responsive step was taken by Japan's government or
the Diet.
5. M&A SCHEMES MADE MORE FLEXIBLE BY CORPORATE-LAW
REFORM IN 1990S AND 2000s
Since the late 1990s, Japan has been in a tough period of recovery as a result
of the bursting of an economic bubble. The government's basic strategy was
to facilitate competition. Therefore, corporate law was expected to
encourage merger and acquisition (M&A) activity by enabling corporations
to use schemes that are new to Japan, and by introducing a less burdensome
procedure that allowed shareholders' meetings to be skipped for small-scale
amalgamations. The first break from the traditional framework was the
introduction of share exchanges and share transfers in the 1999
Akira Morita, J, )_.O A% (Social Responsibility ofModern Corporations)
(Tokyo: Shoji-houmu, 1978).
112 Morita, "Stock Buyback as an Emergency Evacuation", supra note 108 at 93-94. (Seealso
ibid at 80-88 for related articles).
113 Under what was then Article 266 of the Commercial Code.
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amendments." 4 This change enabled corporations to have a 100%
shareholding relationship, through resolutions at shareholders' meetings of
the party corporations, without the consent of every shareholder." 5 The
change included the establishment of holding companies." 6
In 2000, schemes for corporate divestures with universal succession of
assets and liabilities were introduced in Japan.' 17 In the process of enabling a
divesture with universal succession, protection of creditors, especially
employees, was to be seriously discussed, as the effect of universal succession
could be to change a debtor corporation without the individual consent of
creditors. Employees, especially, could be harmed by a corporate divesture,
because their working conditions could be drastically changed. However,
substantial protections were not provided for employees, other than as
contractual counterparties in the Commercial Code. Instead, the Diet
responded to this concern by establishing new legislation, the 2000 Act on
the Succession to Labour Contracts upon Company Split,"8 declared in force at
the same time as the amendment to the Commercial Code. The current
"4 See MasafumiNakahigashi, =e M.. -_ LA POiA . 4Li , ff (Business Combination,
Corporate Governance, and CorporateFinance) at 171-228 (Tokyo: Shinzansha, 1999) (as
the leading article that advocated introduction of share exchange transactions into
corporate law), originally published as Masafumi Nakahigashi,
"7 / 9 t &±-)- L / x -Zf " (Triangular Mergers and Share Transfer in
the United States) (1994) 28:1 Chukyo-h6gaku 1.
115 These share transfers originate in Japan, where a party corporation can establish its 100%
holding corporation at the same time as the effective date of the transaction. See
CompaniesAct, supra note 77, art 2 item 31, art 783, art 795.
116 This change refers both to corporations (i.e., a corporation to be a wholly owning parent
and an corporation to be a wholly owned subsidiary through a share-for-share exchange,
which is an M & A method unique to Japan), as well as the ModelBusiness Corporation
Act. See Committee on Corporate Laws, Model Business Corporation Act (Chicago:
American Bar Association, 2008).
"7 See Masafumi Nakahigashi, "MOKFAM" (Corporate Reorganizations) Nakahigashi &
Matsui, supra note 102 at 257.
118 Act on the Succession to Labor Contracts upon Company Split, Act No 103 of 2000,
translated by Japanese Law Translation, online: <http://www.japaneselaw
translation.go.jp>.
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Article 1 reads: "The purpose of this Act is to promote the protection of
workers by prescribing special provisions, etc. to the CompaniesAct (Act No.
86 of 2005) concerning succession, etc. to labour contracts in cases where a
company is split." The point to be emphasized is not only that the Act was
not built into the Commercial Code, but also that it is under the jurisdiction
of the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW), not the Ministry
ofJustice, which means that the Act was established outside of the traditional
scope of corporate law.
The latest amendment to enable more flexible M&A transactions was
brought into force on the establishment of the Companies Act of 2005. The
Companies Act allows the use of cash or other property besides shares in
amalgamations, share exchanges, corporate divestures, etc.19Squeeze-ou ts of
minority shareholders are now deemed not to be illegalper se, although there
are still questions as to what procedure would be appropriate and how much
the fair price for minority shareholders should be. The change of basic policy
was symbolic in the introduction of a new kind of shares, "class shares subject
to class-wide call" (zenbu-shutoku-jokou-tsuki shurui-kabushiki)."2 ° Beyond
their original purpose, these kinds of shares have been frequently used for
management buyouts. There have been abusive management buyouts, and
courts have been trying to temper such activities, but such efforts seem
largely in vain. Currently, the Corporate Law Committee at the Legislative
Council is considering amendment of the CompaniesAct to respond to these
abusive activities.' 2 1
119 Companies Act, supra note 77, art 749.
120 Ibid, art 108(1) specifies: "A Stock Company may issue two or more classes of shares with
different features which have different provisions on the following matters" and its item 7
reads, "such Stock Company shall acquire all of such class shares by resolution of the
shareholders meeting". The original purpose for allowing such kinds of shares was to
squeeze out existing shareholders in order to enable insolvent corporations to finance new
equity without using legal insolvent-reorganization (rehabilitation) procedures.
121 See Toru Kitagawa, MBO -- 1 (] IT]
(Re-considering Cases on Determining Stock Prices in MBOs (Parts 1 & 2) (2010)
1889-1890 Sh6ji-h6mu 4 at 4. See also Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry,
0 )5-L(re4e (MB
0) tL N1 t Ma ( Guidelines on Increasing Corporate Value and Ensuri ngReguIa to ry
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The major disputes centre on the form of appraisal remedies, and the
courts are expected to determine fair value of shares by exercising their
reasonable discretion.' The effect on stakeholders of bought-out
corporations is rarely discussed. However, the establishment of a
corporation's reputation has been considered one of the big merits of
listing on stock exchanges, and it is considered worth the cost of listing to
attract employees with high value. Putting it another way, it could make
employees nervous about management buyouts, but these issues are rarely, if
ever, discussed.
6. FULL-SCALE HOSTILE-TAKEOVERS BOOM INMID-2000s
The year 2005 was highly disruptive for corporate managers, as many full-
blown hostile takeovers were launched, each deal drastically larger in number
and scale than the previous one. Armour et al have observed that Japan's
severe economic problems and financial-system distress in the 1990s caused a
loosening of the keiretsu corporate-group linkages, and cross-shareholding
and stable shareholding practices declined substantially through the mid-
2000s.12 3 They suggest that Japanese financial institutions' ownership
declined markedly, in large measure due to international capital-adequacy
Compliance in the Context ofManagement Buyouts (MBOs)) (4 September 2007), online:
Government of Japan <http://search.e-gov.go.jp/servlet/PcmFileDownload?seqNo
=0000027760>.
122 The disputes occur both in negotiations and before the court. Parties are expected to
negotiate disputes arising under the Companies Act before they bring any dispute to the
court. This type of lawsuit is categorized into cases examined under the Non-Contentious
Cases ProceduresAct. See Companies,4ct, supra note 77, art 870(4)(ff). The bill was passed
on May 20,2011 as Act No. 51 of 2011, in force 1 January 2013. For the discussion of the
Diet Discussion Committee on Non-Contentious Cases Procedures Act of Legislative
Council, see "Division Domestic Relations TrialAct - Legislative Council" (in Japanese),
online: Ministry of Justice <http://www.moj.go.jp/shingil/shingikai_ hishoujiken.
html>.
123 John Armour, Jack B Jacobs & Curtis J Milhaupt, "A Comparative Analysis of Hostile
Takeover Regimes in the US, UKandJapan (With Implications for Emerging Markets)"
(12August 2010) [unpublished, Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No 377,
online: SSRN <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1657953>].
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requirements and the need to clean up their balance sheets. This trend left an
opportunity for foreign ownership of shares by institutional investors, which
increased their holdings to 27% of market capitalization in 2008, almost
three times the amount held in the mid-1990s.
124
The hostile takeover that first shocked corporate managers, was a case in
which Mr. Takafumi Horie, former CEO of Livedoor, tried to buy out
Nippon Broadcasting System, Inc. (NBS) in 2005. In an attempt to defeat
Livedoor's bid, the NBS board issued to Fuji warrants whose exercise would
drastically dilute Livedoor's stake; the Tokyo High Court affirmed the
injunction. 2 5 Armour et al observe:
The Livedoor court enumerated four examples of abusive motives: (1)
greenmail, (2) 'scorched earth' practices involving stripping the target of
intellectual property or key customer relationships after the acquisition, (3)
liquidation of the target's assets to pay down debt of the acquirer, and (4)
selling off assets unrelated to the core business of the target in order to pay a
[large] dividend. 126
The Court in Livedoor found insufficient evidence to establish any of
these motives and held that the NBS board had issued the warrants with the
primary purpose of preserving management's control.
127
Since 2005, many listed corporations have introduced ex ante defensive
measures, especially so-called "advance warning-type defense measures",
128
Management of target corporations often try to defend them by announcing
benefits to stakeholders, especially employees, as well as triggering defensive
measures that occurred in SteelPartners v Bull-DogSauce.129 In that case, U.S.
124 Ibid at 35.
125 Tokyo High Court Decision of 23 March 2005, 1173 Hanrei Times 125 (Nippon
Broadcasting System v Livedoor) [Livedoor].
126 Armour et al, supra note 122 at 38.
127 Ibid.
128 See generally, Amane Fujimoto et al, "iZ10, MRP)MMO)k [ R (Present
Situation of Defensive Measures against Hostile Takeovers) (2010) 1915 Sh6ji-h6mu 38.
129 See Supreme Court decision of 7August 2007, 61:5 Minshu 2215. See also Wataru Tanaka,
"7'Ai K¢" >/ ' Y , W T) " (Legal Analysis on the Bull-
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private-equity fund Steel Partners and its affiliates owned 10.25% of the
outstanding shares of Bull-Dog Sauce, and in 2007, an affiliate of Steel
Partners launched a tender offer for all of the company's outstanding shares.
As a defensive measure, the board of Bull-Dog Sauce made a discriminatory
allocation of warrants to shareholders, each warrant exercisable into one
common share. Steel Partners was issued the warrants, but was the only
shareholder prohibited from exercising them; rather, it could receive only the
cash value of the stock into which the warrants could have been exercised.
The shareholders approved the defensive measure by special resolution,
garnering 83% support. Steel Partners sought a preliminary injunction from
the Tokyo District Court to enjoin the warrant issuance, which the Tokyo
District Court dismissed, concluding that the discriminatory allocation of
warrants was not in conflict with the principle of shareholder equality where
the company's stockholders have approved the measure by special resolution
and equal economic benefits to shareholders are assured. 130 The Tokyo High
Court affirmed this decision, finding that discriminatory treatment among
shareholders based on the attributes of the shareholders does not violate the
principle of shareholder equality if the measure is necessary and reasonable to
Dog Case) (2007) 1809-1810 Sh6ji-h6mu 4 at 15; Mafumi Nakahigashi,
""/ , (Legal Strategies and
Judicial Examination on the Bull-Dog Case) (2007) 59:11 Kigyo-kaikei 70; Masafumi
Nakahigashi, "7 "ib ' Yv : 7 V '' , t " (The Bull-Dog
Case and Respecting the Decision of the Shareholders Meeting) (2007) 1346Juristo 17;
Shigeru Morimoto, -2'A-' r 7 V vs.-7,A5--- • - -)-- l- 4{ ----
q6 Q jI] . • IE-M"T" (Bull-Dog vs Steel
Partners Case: Allotment Without Contribution of Stock Purchase Rights (SPRs),
Shareholder Equality Principle and Unfair Issuance) in Masafumi Nakahigashi, Kenichi
Osugi & Gaku Ishiwata, eds, M& AP] I0) -)Y* L R R II (Cases on Mergers and
Acquisitions II: Analysis and Future Development) (Tokyo: Keizai-horei-kenkyukai, 2010)
6; Sadakazu Osaki, "The Bull-Dog Sauce Takeover Defense" (2007) 10:3 Nomura
Capital Market Review 2; Linklaters, 'Steel Partners v Bull-Dog Sauce: Analysis" (10
August 2007), online: <http://www.linklaters.com/pdfs/publications/japan/
SteelPartnersvsBulldog Client.pdf> (use Internet Explorer as browser to access).
'3 Tokyo District CourtDecision of28June 2007,1805 Sh6ji-h6mu 43 (Steel Partners Japan
Strategic Fund (Offshore), LP v Bull-Dog Sauce Ltd).
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prevent damage to corporate value. 3 ' The Court held that Steel Partners was
an abusive bidder (ran-yo teki baishu sha), based on its short-term strategy of
reselling the shares of the target company at a profit to a third party or to the
target company itself, or of selling the assets of the target company at a
profit.'32 The Court held that in the face of an abusive bidder, the
reasonableness test would be satisfied if the defensive measure did not cause
excessive or unreasonable damage to the bidder. On further appeal, the
Supreme Court ofJapan affirmed the decision on the basis that the warrant
issuance was necessary and reasonable; the Court held that the issuance was
not inconsistent with the principle of equality, finding it unnecessary to
inquire into the abuse, as it was for the shareholders to determine whether
damage would arise on the acquisition of control.'33
These tensions are also reflected in policy reports. For example, the
Corporate Value Study Group of METI released Takeover Defense Measures
in Light of Recent Environmental Changes in 2008, offering a clearer
understanding of for whom corporate value should be protected:
The premise of takeover defense measures is that they should be ultimately
for the protection of the interests of shareholders. Rights plans in the United
States, which presuppose that shareholders finally decide to support or
oppose takeovers through appointment or dismissal of directors at the
general meeting of shareholders, are viewed as a mechanism that makes it
possible to draw out from the acquirers and the incumbent management of
the target companies better takeover terms and management proposals for
shareholders. In other words, rights plans are understood as measures for
protecting the interests of shareholders....
The board of directors must not obscure the interests to be protected by
takeover defense measures by referring to the interests of stakeholders other
than shareholders in cases that does not protect or enhance the shareholder
'3' Tokyo High Court Decision of 9July 2007, 1806 Sh6ji-homu 40 (Steel Partners Japan
Strategic Fund (Offshore), LP v Bull-Dog Sauce Ltd).
132 Ibid at 51.
133 Supreme Court Decision of 7August 2007, 1809 Sh6ji-h6mu 16 at 18-19 (Steel Partners
Japan Strategic Fund (Offshore), LP v Bull-Dog Sauce Co, Ltd).
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interests, or must not broadly interpret implementation terms for the
purpose of managerial entrenchment." 4
Constituency clauses in the United States have been understood by
Japanese corporate scholars as negative, because theygive managers an ability
to entrench themselves, with wide discretion and little accountability.
135
Arguably, the resistance to directors'use of stakeholders'interests as an excuse
when exercising defensive measures is because such scholars believe that
directors ultimately have to run the business for shareholders.
According to Professor Hiroaki Hara, in the early stages of discussion,
especially discussion concerning employees as corporate stakeholders, some
scholars supported directors' efforts to defend their corporations from hostile
takeovers in order to protect employees' firm-specific investments in Japanese
corporations. 36 Such protection would, in turn, contribute to the
competitiveness of Japan's corporations. Hara has observed that the co-
operative feature of the relationship between employees and Japan's
corporations contributes to shareholders' benefit; the most important
resources that create added value are well-trained and well-organized
employees. 13 7 However, he suggests that these rationales are not supportable,
because in theory, the value of firm-specific human assets is to be reflected in
134 Corporate Value Study Group, METI, Takeover Defense Measures in Light of Recent
Environmental Changes (Tokyo: METI, 2008) at 2,7, online: <http://www.meti.go.jp/
english/report/data/080630TakeoverDefenseMeasures.pdf>. Members of the Group
included several respected scholars, including Professor Hideki Kanda, University of
Tokyo, as the chairperson.
135 For a discussion between the Panel (Professors Shigeru Morimoto and Masafumi
Nakahigashi) and the floor discussants (Professor Minoru Tokumot, etc.) on CSR and
employees' protection, see Shigeru Morimoto et al, ,
(Rethinking the Law of Groups of Companies Overall) (2009) 71 Shiho 124 at 168-71
(Records of Symposium at annual meeting of Japan Associate of Private Law (Nihon
Shihogakkai Fl JA*'-) (held on October 12 & 13)).
136 Hiroaki Hara, " L 0) N1 r l ]{" (Corporate Relationship of
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stock price, and because in fact, abusive breaches of implicit contract,
typically long-life employment, are not observed by empirical studies.
38
In spite of Professor Hara's analysis, the initial point about the connection
of employee protection to shareholder value and overall corporate benefit
has merit. But that debate has rarely occurred in Japan's scholarly community
or business practices. Many leading scholars have been involved in major
hostile-takeover cases, hired to offer their legal opinions, and policy decisions
have been takingplace in the courtroom, not the public-policy arena. Before
it became the subject of a more scholarly or public debate, the hostile-
takeover boom ended with the global financial crisis.
C. CURRENT DISCUSSION AT LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL
Currently, the Corporate Law Committee of the Japanese Legislative
Council is working on a proposal to the Minister ofJustice containingpoints
for corporate-law reform.139 The triggering event was the change of political
power from the LDP to the Democratic Party ofJapan (DPJ) in 2009. The
Minister of Justice made a request to the Legislative Council for potential
amendments to the Companies Act, especially from the viewpoint of ensuring
trust from a wide range of stakeholders with interests in the corporation. 4 °
The suggested main topics are legal regimes on corporate governance and on
corporate groups and business combinations. Concerning these topics, a
new feature is that "Rengo", the Japanese Trade Union Confederation and
an important supporter of the DPJ, has dispatched its representative to
the Committee.
138 Ibid at 106-07. For the detailed analysis, see Wataru Tanaka,
"OA 'ItM 1q lt-- t i;& ii -lo(-O ) ' " (Note on Defensive Measures
against Hostile Takeovers (Part II)) (2005) 131:6 Minshohou-zashi 800. He suggests that
the theory of"breach of trust" dominates anti-takeover statutes in many states in the U.S.
(See ibid at 809).
139 Distributed materials and minutes are available at the MOJ website. See Ministry of
Justice, "Corporate Law Committee-Legislative Council" (in Japanese), online: MOJ
<http://www.moj.go.jp/shingil/shingi03500005.html> [MOJ, "Corporate Law
Committee"] (NB: file location will move into the database for past committees).




Rengo is presenting two major proposals to the Committee. 41 The first
proposal is to introduce a new system that enables employees to propose a
candidate to be corporate auditor (kansayaku) for a shareholders'meeting.'4 2
There has been strong opposition to this proposal from the business world,
scholars, and legal professionals, and Rengo has not been able to garner any
public support. The reason for the opposition is that the potential role of a
corporate auditor dispatched by employees is ambiguous, especially in the
context of business judgments, potentially creating serious conflicts between
shareholders'value and employees' interests. Other reasons are that it could
bring unnecessary trouble to decision-making processes, and that most
directors in Japan's corporations are former employees in the same
corporations and as such are unlikely to harm employees unless there are
emergency events. Moreover, according to the Ministry of Health, Labour
and Welfare, lifelong or long-term stable employment, which has been
deemed one ofJapan's traditional employment customs, is being re-evaluated
in the 21st century, but is still the main custom in Japanese corporations,
despite pressures to revise it in the 1990s. 143
The second proposal by Rengo is to enable employees to express their
opinions when an M&A transaction or issue is going to be discussed at a
shareholders' meeting. Their opinions would be distributed to all
shareholders with the business report or financial report, etc., in advance of
the meeting. Here again, Rengo's views are unsupported. The reasons given
against the proposal are that it would delay profitable reorganization, and
that employees can express their opinions in other ways.'
44
141 For the discussion below, see materials and minutes of the Committee available at MOJ,
"Corporate Law Committee", supra note 139.
142 Kansayaku is a system unique to Japan. See Japan Corporate Auditors Association,
Corporate Auditor System in Japan, online: <http://www.kansa.or.jp/en>.
143 Ministry of Health, Labour andWelfare, T)h214- W SfM 0) 3JTf (2009Analysis
ofLaborEconomy) at 185. The report suggests that corporations tended to limit number
of permanent employees in 1990s, and that nearly 70% of corporations are willing to
maintain "long-term stable employment" for as many workers as possible at present and in
the future.
144 See e.g. Outlines of Opinions Submitted to "Interim Proposal Concerning Revision of
CompaniesAct" Material no 19 for the Corporate Law Committee, (22 February 2012);
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These proposals were not adopted in a report from the Legislative
Council to the Minister ofJustice.'4 5 Besides discussion in the Committee, it
will be necessary to watch for future political movement. Since the DPJ lost
its majority seat at the House of Councillors, any legislative amendments
cannot be enacted without co-operation with the other parties under the
current nejire kokkai (twisted or deadlocked) Diet. Thus, there are
uncertainties with the present government, and there is speculation that the
current House of Representatives, which is the lower house, could be
dissolved and a general election held. Issues are therefore in flux, and in this
political situation, while proposed legislative bills that do not relate to the
recent earthquake disaster continue to be on the Diet's table for discussion,
they are unlikely to be the subject of active consideration.146 Any progress is
unlikely for an extended period, given that the government's attention is
appropriately directed towards dealingwith the damage and harms from the
terrible earthquake, which seems to have reduced the former conflict
between parties.
Minutes ofthe 8thMeetingofthe Committee (22 December 2010) at 14-20, online: MOJ
<http:// www.moj.go.jp/content/000068174.pdf>; Minutes of the 18th Meeting of the
Committee (21 March 2012) at 46-47, online: MOJ <http://www.moj.go.jp/content/
000097964.pdf>. See also Interim Proposal ConcerningRevision of CompaniesAct, online:
Tokyo Stock Exchange <http://www.tse.or.jp/english/news/09/ 111219_a.html> (an
unofficial English translation supplied by the Tokyo Stock Exchange mainly for foreign
investors).
145 On August 1, 2012, the Corporate Law Commission finalized the draft of the Points for
the Amendments, and the report is pending approval of the General Meeting of the
Legislative Council as of September 2012. See Legislative Council, Proposal Concerning
Revision of Companies Act (7 September 2012), online: MOJ <http://www.moj.go.jp/
content/000 102013.pdf>.
146 Two opposing views exist. One is that the LDP and the DPJ would collaborate in
response to the matters. It would be possible that all the bills submitted by Cabinet
(through MOJ in case of corporate law) would be passed with little discussion at the Diet.
Sometimes this kind of procedure is taken due to political expediency.
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1. UNCHANGED BASIC STANCE OF CORPORATE LAW
To summarize, the transformation of corporate law in Japan has not
advanced a shift towards CSR in the sense of supplying a framework for
corporate activities that would internalize possible externalities and create
new duties and liabilities for directors and officers. The changes do not
explicitly recognize specific stakeholders other than shareholders and
creditors in general. In practice, corporations are run on the basis of profits,
and corporate law does not expect them to conduct CSR without direct or
indirect benefits to the corporation. Their contributions to society would
not stand on their citizenship, but on a business basis. Therefore, in order to
achieve greater protection of employees, the environment, etc.,Japan has to
enact laws in a different form.
As a matter of corporate law, CSR has been commonly understood as one
of many business strategies in Japan. In terms of risk management, directors
address changing circumstances. If they foresee changes to laws, the
establishment of comparable standards for CSR, and/or the rise of social
movements, then they would prepare for their corporations to easily adjust
their business activities to the possible changes. To that extent, corporate law
could require corporate directors to promote CSR activities even without
any enforceable laws yet in place.
V. LABOUR LAW
Employees have been one of the major stakeholder groups discussed in terms
of CSR. Japan has taken the same view as Canada, where "the duty of care
provisions are often referred to or reflected in liability provisions in respect
of employment, labour, pensions and environment legislation. 147
Laws on employment are under the jurisdiction of the MHLW,148 which
seems to have little involvement or concern in the ongoing discussion of
147 Janis P Sarra & Ronald B Davis, Director and Officer Liability in Corporate Insolvency:
A Comprehensive Guide to Rights and Obligations, 2d ed (Markham, Ont: LexisNexis,
2010) at 44.
148 The MHLW website is available in English. See Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare,
online: < http://www.mhlw.go.jp/english>.
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amendment to the Companies Act.149 The only exception was the
enactment of the Act on the Succession to Labour Contracts upon Company
Split in 2000, when a corporate-divestitures system was introduced into
Japanese corporate law.' 5
0
The limited progress towards CSR in theory or practice in Japan may be
at least partly due to the fact that lawmakers and scholars of labour law are
not necessarily eager to collaborate with those of corporate law to realize
C SR-type initiatives. Perhaps they believe that only employment law should
address CSR concerns regarding employees; however, the outputs, laws, and
regulations of lawmakers and labour scholars are not particularly effective.
They have been unsuccessful in enforcing their regulations against
corporations with legal sanctions, due largely to strong objections from the
business world. Many regulatory rules are in the form of provisions requiring
best efforts, essentially corporations following the provisions as far as they
can afford to accept them. Such best efforts are not backstopped by
enforceable standards. Usually, Japanese corporations do not observe best-
effort rules. 5 '
However, there are also counterbalancing norms that have some
attributes of CSR. In Japan, many corporations are cash rich and their price-
to-book ratio (PBR) is low, meaning that Japanese corporations have reserve
cash to keep employees paid when market demand is low, rather than
following the Anglo-American practice of massive layoffs of employees when
demand drops. This PBR enables them to keep the practice of lifetime
employment, one of Japan's long-standing traditions, which continues to
exist-albeit with some exceptions, such as part-time workers and dispatched
workers from temporary staff-recruitment agencies. Traditionally, Japan's
labour law has been considered to be a regime friendly to employees.
149 See, Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare Establishment Act arts 3 and 4 (Act No 97
of 2009) ". Art 3 is on their mission, and Art 4 is on the affairs under the jurisdiction.
Japan traditionally has had a vertically segmented administrative system (or
overcompartmentalized bureaucracy).
'0 See Hara, supra note 13 5 at 71 (where he finds that the enactment of the Act was the only
event that corporate law and labour law were both enthusiastic about).
151 Interview of Professor Hajime Wada, Nagoya University (9 March 2011).
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However, it has been deregulated through legislative initiatives such as
amendments to the Act for Securing the Proper Operation of Worker
Dispatching Undertakings and Improved Working Conditions for Dispatched
Workers of 1985.152 This Act has enabled corporations to use dispatched
workers flexibly, which means that such workers are in less stable
employment positions.
Also, the number and ratio of non-permanent and part-time employees is
increasing. They are vulnerable in periods of business depression, in spite of
the fact that labour law attempts to facilitate a change of status from non-
permanent to permanent under certain conditions. For such employees'
protection, the Act on Improvement, etc. ofEmploymentManagementfor Part-
Time Workers was established in 1993. Its Article 8 reads:
With regard to a Part-Time Worker for whom the description of his/her
work and the level of responsibilities associated with said work (hereinafter
referred to as "Job Description") are equal to those of ordinary workers
employed at the referenced place of business (hereinafter referred to as "Part-
Time Worker with EqualJob Description") and who has concluded a labor
contract without a definite period with a business operator, and whose Job
Description and assignment are likely to be changed within the same range
as the Job Description and assignment of said ordinary workers, in light of
the practices at said place of business and other circumstances, throughout
the entire period until the termination of the employment relationship with
said business operator (hereinafter referred to as "Part-Time Worker
Equivalent to Ordinary Workers"), the business operator shall not engage in
discriminatory treatment in terms of the decision of wages, the
implementation of education and training, the utilization ofwelfare facilities
and other treatments for workers by reason of being a Part-Time Worker.
The labor contract without a definite period set forth in the preceding
paragraph shall include such a labour contract with a definite period that is
152 Actfor Securing the Proper Operation of Worker Dispatching Undertakings and Improved
Working Conditionsfor Dispatched Workers,Act no 88 of 1985, translated by Japanese Law
Translation, online: <http://www.japaneselawrranslation.go.jp>.
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repeatedly renewed and is therefore reasonably deemed to be a labour
contract without a definite period under socially accepted conventions."'
The critical problem regarding this provision is that it is not enforced by
any penalties, which means the provision is understood as a best-effort rule.
If part-time employees want to be deemed permanent employees, for whom
labour law offers greater protection, then they have the ability to commence
legal action, including lawsuits. However, employees see the possibility that
such actions would encourage corporations not to renew their contracts, and
thus, they are hesitant to enforce their rights, considering the time, costs, and
possible loss of employment.
Rengo expressed its opinion of the Act and International Labour
Organization (ILO) C 175 of 1994 as follows:1 4
Rengo has collaborated with political parties out of power, e.g., Social
Democratic Party of Japan, New Komeito (Japanese political party),
Democratic Socialist Party at the time, in order for the government and LDP
to move to enact the Act on Improvement, etc. ofEmployment Management
for Part-Time Workers in 1993 at last.
However, the Act to facilitate improvement of treatment of part-time
employees through administrative guidance is far from what Rengo and the
collaborated parties required, i.e., "prohibition on discriminative treatment
in working conditions with a reason of part-time employees" and there
existed no amendment of the Act until now.
In 1994, at the International Labour Conference of ILO "C175 Part-
Time Work Convention" was adopted. Rengo was for the Convention, but
Japan's employers were against and the Japanese government abstained from
voting. By the adoption, the big effect was expected on amendment of the
Act. However, the government has not been taking active response, for the
reasons of employment customs specific to Japan, e.g., seniority
wage system.
153 Act on Improvement, etc. ofEmploymentManagementforPart-Time Workers,Act no 76 of
1993, art 8, translated by Cabinet Secretariat, online: <http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/
hourei/data/PTW.pdf>.
'54 Rengo, "i 5 S--- i L J " (What Is Part-Time Employment for
Rengo?) at 5, online: <http://www.jtuc-rengo.or.jp/roudou/koyou/hiseikiroudou/
part/houshin/indexhtml> [translated and abridged by the authors].
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Rengo and other unions have been requesting the government to ratify ILO
175, but to date, their efforts have been in vain. 15
In spite of the current legal regime, corporations sometimes are willing to
take care of employees beyond what laws with enforcement powers
require. '56 If, and only if, corporations see any possible changes in written law
and/or case law, do they commence preparing to satisfy the foreseeable
standards and/or rules even before the law comes into force. The reason is
their recognition of the time and effort required to respond to the changes.
With fear of future and possible violation of the law, corporations have
incentive beyond what the current law requires. Any action would be
undertaken as a result of their own judgment as a part of their risk-
management strategy. In terms of corporate law, directors would be
personally liable under their duty of care if they did not respond to possible
changes in law in a timely and effective manner.
Japanese-based global corporations are very sensitive to so-called "country
risk" in developing their business outside Japan. As with many corporations
operating internationally, they have concerns about meeting changing legal
standards in labour or environmental protection in host countries that differ
radically from the standards in their home jurisdiction. When a Japanese
corporation enters a country, through a subsidiary or other business entity
that is part of the corporate group, it enters understanding the particular
corporate law, labour, and other remedial statutes. If the laws were to change
considerably, it might create increased risk for the Japanese corporation
operating in the host jurisdiction, with implications for the entire corporate
group. In this context, the development of CSR norms in a host jurisdiction
may be more readily acceptable, but the imposition of strict legal standards
may encounter resistance by Japanese corporations.
Finally, under securities regulation in Japan, listed corporations are
requested to include information on employment issues in their public
155 See e.g. ibid, Zenroren (National Confederation of Trade Unions), " 'i_"
(Homepage), online: <http://www.zenroren.gr.jp/jp/kintou/index.html>.
156 Interview of Professor Hajime Wada, Nagoya University (9 March 2011) (the following
reasons are also from the interview).
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annual reports, pursuant to the Financial Instruments and ExchangeAct.'57
The reports must include information on affairs of employment.118 For
example, Sony's annual report for financial year 2010 reads, "In our
corporation and its consolidated subsidiaries, 23% of employees belong to
the unions, and the labour-management relations are good. 15 9The purpose
of the disclosure is to supply material information to investors, and it can be
understood in a context of the specific corporation's risk management.
Hence, elements of CSR are made transparent through securities law,
particularly in terms of disclosing employee unrest or satisfaction. However,
labour and similar laws that address employees are somewhat segregated from
any moves to create a broader CSR approach. Therefore, there is no field of
law responsible for requiring corporations to undertake CSR as society
expects at present. The future ofC SR on labour issues would largely depend
on how seriously disclosures requested by securities law would be taken by
both society and investors. If contents of disclosure become standards in
Japan, there would exist strong commitment by corporations to society
and employees.
VI. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
A number of issues regarding C SR and environmental law in the corporate-
law context have been touched on above. In Japan, environmental law is
under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Environment Government
(MOE). In 2001 it was upgraded from an agency (cho) to a ministry (sbo). 6°
The government in 1998 also established the Institute for Global
157 Financial Instruments and Evchange Act, Act No 25 of 1948, art 24, translated by
Financial Services Agency, online: <http://www.fsa.go.jp/common/law/fle01.pdf>.
158 Ibid, art 15, item 1 & Form 3 (Cabinet Office Ordinance concerning Disclosure of
Corporate Affairs).
159 See Sony, 2010 Annual Financial Report (28 June 2010) at 17, online: Ullet
<http://www.ullet.com/edinet/S00064AG.pdf>. (The information is much less fruitful
than annual reports in the United States. C.f Sony, Form 20-FforFY201 0, at 105-106
[under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in the United States]).
160 See Ministry of the Environment, online: MOE <http://www.env.go.jp/en>.
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Environmental Strategies (IGES), 16 ' signalling its interest in being engaged
in environmental-protection initiatives.
In Japanese legal scholarship, few scholars specialize in environmental law,
and their focus is primarily on individual subtopics, such as torts,
administrative law, and international public law, without a comprehensive
framework for the intersection of these discreet areas with corporate law.
Japanese tort law initially responded to a huge problem of pollution in the
period of rapid growth in Japan after World War II. As noted above, a large
number of judgments against corporations required them to try to
internalize the externalities, with corporations addressing pollution as a
matter of risk management. The tort litigation included the government as a
defendant. In addition to domestic affairs, corporations became more
sensitive to global affairs.
Mr. Eiichiro Adachi, chief researcher of the Japan Research Institute,
insists that corporate business and environmental matters are entering a new
phase; corporations are now facing actual events that can negatively
influence them.162These influences include a strengthening of regulations to
limit business activities, and rising costs due to the influence of
environmental degradation. 16 3  He emphasizes the possibility that
environmental adaptation will be key to corporate risk management."
However, there are considerable challenges to Japan meeting the stream
of international environmental conventions. The profitability of
corporations is still not back to the time prior to the economic shocks felt
after Lehman Brothers' failure. The views of the business world are that the
current government is not developing proper policies to facilitate business
161 See Institute for Global Environmental Strategies, online: <http://www.iges.or.jp
/en/index.html>. The first chair was Mr.Akio Morishima, Professor Emeritus at Nagoya
University and former visiting professor at the University of British Columbia. His
original specialty was tort, especially public pollution.
162 EiichiroAdachi," T RRY,', 10%. U ftc M" (Environmentally Conscious Business
Strategies) (2011) 581 Gekkan-Kansayaku 4 at 4.
163 -Ibid (for a brief history concerning on international movements andJapan's response, see
ibid at 4-12).
164 Ibid at 5.
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activities, including tax-rate reductions. The private sector in Japan often
concludes that it is not able to afford the costs of addressing environmental
problems without specific direction by law and/or being able to foresee
business gain over the cost.
As noted in the introduction, there are also serious issues surrounding
emissions. In 2009, former Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama's speech at
United Nations Summit on Climate Change declared thatJapan would have
a 25% decrease in emissions compared with its 1990 level by the year 2020.165
The response ofJapanese corporations was that such a target was impossible,
yet corporations are required to respond to the targeted amount of
reduction. The public-policy debate in this respect continues, but it may now
have been delayed by the more pressing issues in the aftermath of
the earthquakes.166
The Japanese government has expressed some interest in biological
diversity as another CSR-type initiative-the notion of introducing a new
era of living in harmony with nature. The interest and potential commitment
to this was born at the Nagoya Biodiversity Summit. 67 Some environmental
reports published by listed corporations refer to the problems of creating
biological diversity; however, here again, what they can do seems to be
limited in the current depressed economy.
In spite of the global financial downturn, it is noteworthy to mention
Canadian and U.S. developments in transparency of corporate activity
regarding the environment. As noted earlier, Canadian National Instrument
51-102 expands the scope of required disclosure, and the Annual
Information Form expressly includes disclosure of environmental policies as
risk factors, such as environmental and health risks and political
165 Yukio Hatoyama, "Statement by Prime MinisterYukio Hatoyama at the United Nations
Summit on Climate Change" Speeches and Statements by Prime Minister (22 September
2009), online: Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, <http://www.kantei.go.jp/
foreign/hatoyama/statement/200909/ehat_0922_e.html>.
166 See Ministry of the Environment, supra note 159.
167 See Convention on Biological Diversity, "COP-10 Documents" (18-29 October




considerations. Even in the U.S., where interest in climate-change issues is
said to be low, 168 the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has
released its interpretation of needed disclosure requirements in its
Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change.'69
If the Financial Services Agency (FSA) in Japan were to require listed
corporations to state this kind of information in their annual reports, just as
they currently must on labour relations, companies would have to take a
further step in considering environmental issues associated with their
productive activities. It would be natural progress to require a statement on
climate-change issues in annual reports, which are the most important
disclosure documents for investors. 7
The enrichment of required contents of annual reports means that the
stated items are important for investment decisions and for evaluating
corporate profitability. In other words, environmental affairs could be said to
be a matter of risk management in the terminology of corporate law.
However, the possibility of new direct regulations and disclosure
requirements could lead corporations to prepare themselves for the time
when this possibility would be realized. To that extent, corporations are
willing to undertake CSR activities beyond what the current law requires,
just as discussed above regarding labour law.
VII. CONCLUSION
C SR in Japan is at a nascent stage of development. As an expressed normative
goal of corporate law, it has not had much carriage. However, many elements
of CSR have been adopted in other aspects of employment and
environmental law, with sometimes questionable effectiveness. However,
there are two developments that might encourage Japanese directors'
initiatives in CSR activities.
16 Adachi,supra note 161 at 10.
169 SEC, Commission Guidance RegardingDisclosure Related to Climate Change (Release Nos
33-9106; 34-61469; FR-82) (2 February 2010), online: <http://www.sec.gov/rules/
interp/2010/33-9106.pdf>.
170 Adachi, supra note 161 at 10.
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First, while directors and officers are generally expected to manage their
corporations for maximization of corporate value and shareholders'interest,
certain kinds of CSR activities will enhance their business, at least indirectly.
When directors plan and implement C SR activities with such consideration,
they are protected under the business-judgment rule. Historically, the
business-judgment rule in Japan was somewhat different from the one in
Anglo-American jurisdictions, since courts in Japan did not generally
recognize the broad discretion of directors and they tended to second-guess
decisions by later results. 17' However, in a recent 2010 case, the Supreme
Court of Japan respected directors' decisions based on an interpretation of
the business-judgment rule that accorded directors broader discretion and
protected directors where there has been reliance on specialists. 172 By its
nature, it is usually difficult to evaluate how much the specific CSR activities
contribute to the specific corporate profit. Therefore, without specific
evidence indicating that the directors disregarded the business-judgment
rule, such as in cases of conflict of interest, insufficient information, or
irrational decisions, the court indicated that directors would not be
personally liable even if the CSR contribution was too much or unnecessary
as a result.
Furthermore, once de facto standards, especially international standards
for global corporations, are established, directors could be expected to follow
the standards under their fiduciary duties to the corporation. 173 In this sense,
it will be interesting to observe how Japan's corporations respond to ISO
26000.17' Although it is still merely guidance, it could promote CSR
activities by Japan's corporations for at least the following two reasons. First,
171 See e.g. Kenjiro Egashira, 4±i (Laws of Stock Corporations), 3d ed (Tokyo:
Yuhikaku, 2009) at 434-35.
172 Supreme Court Decision ofl 7July 2010,1353 Financial and Business Law Precedents 26
(Apamanshop Network Co case).
171 Professor Kubota considers movements to making standards inside/outside Japan as a
desirable direction. See Kubota, supra note 40 at 15.





ISO 26000 can be expected to supply reasonable grounds for directors to be
protected by the business-judgment rule. Second, directors might be asked
by shareholders, business partners, and other stakeholders to explain why
they are not alert to, and active in, CSR activities. It would come to be
identified as a risk not to follow ISO 26000 insofar as directors are running
the business as corporate citizens. If ISO 26000 is eventually upgraded to a
certification standard, the attitude of Japan's corporations will drastically
change, considering their experience regarding the ISO 9000 series and
14000 series. 175 Certification requirements under ISO 26000 would lead
corporations to follow the guidelines in order to ensure their activities in the
world run smoothly, pursuant to their business judgment.
Second, even if there exists no certain regime at present, corporations are
watching carefully for any possible changes to statutes, regulations, case law,
administrative guidelines, and generally accepted standards. Once they see
the possibility, they start to prepare to respond to the expected changes as an
anticipatory measure. They may try to complete the minimum level of
activities necessary for compliance. At the same time, theywould try to avoid
the risk that the completion would be less than what is expected in fact. In
this sense, there exist two factors leading corporations to promote CSR
activities beyond what the legal regime requests at present. The first factor is
concerning time; corporations need to launch CSR activities on their own
initiative before the actual change of law or standard comes into force and
becomes enforceable. The second factor is uncertainty; corporations cannot
avoid uncertainty in the content of the expected changes. These factors
would not be avoidable in meeting their risk-management obligations, and
they would facilitate CSR activities beyond what the actual legal regime
would require in the future as well as at present.
The above analysis offers insights into how to promote CSR activities in
Japan. One method is to give corporations incentives that will promote their
business development. Another method is to threaten to change laws or
175 See International Organization for Standardization, "ISO 9000 - Quality Management",
online: ISO <http://www.iso.org/iso/home/standards/management-standards/
iso_9000.htm>; International Organization for Standardization, "ISO 14000-
Environmental Management", online: ISO <http://www.iso.org/iso/isol4000>.
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standards, such that Japanese corporations respond as part of their risk-
management strategy.
These two methods can probably be applied to other jurisdictions. The
difference would be thatJapan does not have a tradition of equity in its court
system or a history of a purposive interpretation ofwritten law; therefore, the
political powers that let corporations feel possible change of written law or
administrative guidance with enforcement are more critically important in
Japan than in the common-law jurisdictions. These powers would be political
parties, citizens' movements, pressures from international society, as well as
the government and the Diet.
In conclusion, we refer back to the two types of sustainability discussed at
the outset of this paper: sustainability of corporations and sustainability of
society. They might have been considered not to stand together in Japan
previously. That might explain why the Sustainability Report 2009 ofToyota
Motor Corporation cites the phrase "Users come first, then the dealers and,
lastly, the maker" to show the order of priority in the company. 76 However,
the two kinds of sustainability could be coordinated, as is evident in the
following statement by Toyota personnel. In a recent issue of Nikkei Business
on 21 March 2011, concerning the disaster of east Japan, Mr. Mitsuhiro
Suzuki oftheAichi Social Welfare Conference Volunteer Center, who was an
employee of Toyota Motor Corporation, suggested that the current disaster
might give everyone an opportunity to think about the role of corporations
in Japan.' T7 He observed:
What can corporations offer for support in such serious disasters? Ofcourse,
their immediate concern is financial and other support for their corporate
consituencies, including their employees, clients and consumers.At the same
time, they are expected to more generally support citizens experiencing
hardship. Corporations cannot continue to exist unless citizens take them as
being necessary. In order to successfully encourage such sentiments, it is
176 Toyota Motor Corporation, supra note 16.
177 Interview ofMitsuhiro Suzuki,"M ,i .t :9 a: "(Support




important how the corporate employees conduct themselves in such
situations, as important as manufacturing and good sales.' 75
17 See The Center (in Japanese), online: <http://aichivc.jp> [translated by author).
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